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ORIGINALISM, BALANCED LEGAL REALISM AND 
JUDICIAL SELECTION: A CASE STUDY 
Stephen J. Ware* 
The “balanced realist” view that judging inevitably involves lawmaking is 
widely accepted, even among originalists, such as Justice Scalia, Randy 
Barnett and Steven Calabresi.  Yet many lawyers are still reluctant to 
acknowledge publicly the inevitability of judicial lawmaking.  This reluctance 
is especially common in debates over the Missouri Plan, a method of judicial 
selection that divides the power to appoint judges between the governor and 
the bar. 
The Missouri Plan is one of three widely-used methods of selecting state 
court judges.  The other two are: (1) direct election of judges by the citizenry, 
and (2) appointment of judges by democratically elected officials, typically the 
governor and legislature, with little or no role for the bar.  Each of these two 
methods of judicial selection respects a democratic society’s basic equality 
among citizens—the principle of one-person, one-vote.  In contrast, the 
Missouri Plan violates this principle by making a lawyer’s vote worth more 
than another citizen’s vote. 
This Article provides a case study of the clash between the inevitability of 
judicial lawmaking and the reluctance of lawyers to acknowledge this 
inevitability while defending their disproportionate power under the Missouri 
Plan.  The Article documents efforts by lawyers in one state, Kansas, to defend 
their version of the Missouri Plan by attempting to conceal from the public the 
fact that Kansas judges, like judges in the other 49 states, inevitably make law.  
The case study then shows examples of Kansas judges making law. The Article 
concludes that honesty requires lawyers participating in the debate over 
judicial selection in the United States to forthrightly acknowledge that judges 
make law.  Lawyers who seek to defend the power advantage the Missouri 
Plan gives them over other citizens can honestly acknowledge that this is a 
power advantage in the selection of lawmakers and then explain why they 
believe a departure from the principle of one-person, one-vote is justified in 
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the selection of these particular lawmakers. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Judges make law.  It is not the only thing judges do.  They also run 
courtrooms, hire clerks and attend meetings.  But amidst these other sorts of 
activities, judges also make law.  We have known this at least since the legal 
realists of the early 20th Century.  With the growth, and then dominance, of 
legal realism over the course of the last century, it is now a truism that judges 
make law.1 
Yet many judges and lawyers are still reluctant to acknowledge publicly 
the inevitability of judicial lawmaking.  In fact, judges and lawyers sometimes 
publish statements that tend to conceal from the public the fact that judges 
make law—for example, statements describing the judicial role in a way that 
omits the lawmaking part of this role.  These omissions are especially common 
in debates over the Missouri Plan, a method of judicial selection that divides 
the power to appoint judges between the governor and the bar.2 
The Missouri Plan is one of three widely-used methods of selecting state 
court judges.3  The other two are: (1) direct election of judges by the citizenry, 
and (2) appointment of judges by democratically elected officials, typically the 
governor and/or legislature, with little or no role for the bar.  Each of these two 
methods of judicial selection respects a democratic society’s basic equality 
among citizens—the principle of one-person, one-vote.  Judicial elections 
directly vindicate this principle and appointment of judges indirectly vindicates 
it if the appointment is by officials who themselves were elected under the 
principle of one-person, one-vote.4  In contrast, the Missouri Plan violates this 
 
1. See infra notes 40-41 and accompanying text. 
2. Several variants of the Missouri Plan are in use but they have the following in common:  
When a vacancy on the bench occurs, a nominating commission assesses applicants and narrows 
the pool of applicants from which the governor may select, typically to three; the governor then 
must pick one of those three and that person is thereby appointed to the court without any further 
process, such as a confirmation vote in the legislature; crucially, some members of the 
commission are selected by the bar.  See infra notes 68-71 and accompanying text (describing the 
process in greater detail).  Unfortunately, prominent bar groups use the term “merit selection” 
rather than “Missouri Plan” to describe all judicial appointment systems with a nominating 
commission of any sort, regardless of who selects the commission or whether the commission’s 
power is checked by a confirmation vote in the legislature.  Stephen J. Ware, The Missouri Plan 
in National Perspective, 74 MO. L. REV. 751, 760-61 (2009).  “This term, ‘merit selection,’ is 
‘propagandistic’ and obscures important distinctions among appointive systems. Accordingly, I 
suggest that people reject the term ‘merit selection’ in favor of the more-neutral ‘Missouri Plan’ 
and that people reserve the term ‘Missouri Plan’ for [judicial selection systems] that lack 
confirmation by the senate or similar popularly elected body.” Id. at 761-62 (internal citations 
omitted). 
3. See id. at 752-64 (describing the various methods used). 
4. See id. at 754-55 (“In those states in which the governor may appoint to the court 
whomever he or she wants, subject only to confirmation by a popularly elected body such as the 
state senate, judicial selection is laudably democratic because governors and state senators are 
elected under the principle of one-person-one-vote. In these elections, members of the bar get no 
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principle by making a lawyer’s vote worth more than another citizen’s vote.5  
The Missouri Plan’s central problem is that it is undemocratic. 
 This problem’s importance, however, is apparent only to those who 
realize that judges are lawmakers.  We all realize that governors and legislators 
are lawmakers so each of the fifty United States selects governors and 
legislatures democratically, in direct elections.  We also generally use a form 
of democracy—the indirect democracy of appointment by governors and 
legislatures—to select the leaders of the various government departments, 
boards and commissions that administer a modern state because we understand 
that these officials also make law.  In contrast, we do not select our doctors, 
plumbers and hairdressers democratically because we understand that these 
jobs do not entail making law. 
In general, lawmakers in our society are selected democratically and non-
lawmakers are not selected democratically.  However, judges selected by the 
Missouri Plan are incongruous; they are lawmakers but they are not selected 
democratically.  They are not selected in accord with the basic democratic 
principle of one-person, one-vote. 
Quite simply, the Missouri Plan is an aberrant violation of our society’s 
practice of selecting lawmakers democratically.  This undemocratic aberration 
empowers lawyers at the expense of non-lawyers so it is disappointing, but 
perhaps not surprising, that lawyers are prominent among those who defend 
the Missouri Plan.  Unfortunately, their defense sometimes includes statements 
that may mislead the public into believing that judges do not make law.  Rather 
than candidly educating the public about the judicial role, some lawyers 
arguing for a judicial selection system that especially empowers them make 
arguments based on a mythical view of judging that was refuted nearly a 
century ago by the legal realists. 
The first section of this article briefly outlines the standard, “balanced 
realist” view that judging inevitably involves lawmaking.  In doing so, it 
explains how widely accepted this view is, even among originalists, such as 
Justice Scalia, Randy Barnett and Steven Calabresi.  Section II documents 
efforts by lawyers and judges in one state, Kansas, to defend their (especially 
 
special powers.”). 
5. See supra note 2.  To say that the Missouri Plan violates the principle of one-person-one-
vote is not to say that the Missouri Plan therefore violates the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution.  The Supreme Court’s Equal Protection case law does not require all government 
officials to be selected in accord with one-person-one-vote, see, e.g., Nelson Lund, May Lawyers 
Be Given the Power to Elect Those Who Choose Our Judges? “Merit Selection” and 
Constitutional Law, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1043, 1050-60 (2011), and three federal circuit 
courts have held that various versions of the Missouri Plan fall within these exceptions.  See Dool 
v. Burke, No. 10-3320, 2012 WL 4017118 (10th Cir. Sept. 13, 2012) (Kansas), Carlson v. 
Wiggins, 675 F.3d 1134, 1140-42 (8th Cir. 2012) (Iowa), Kirk v. Carpenti, 623 F.3d 889, 890 
(9th Cir.2010) (Alaska).  For a contrary view, see Dool v. Burke, No. 10-3320, 2012 WL 
4017118 (10th Cir. Sept. 13, 2012) (McKay, J., dissenting); Lund, supra; Joshua Ney, Note, Does 
the Kansas Supreme Court Selection Process Violate the One Person, One Vote Doctrine?, 49 
WASHBURN L.J. 143 (2009). 
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undemocratic) version of the Missouri Plan by attempting to conceal from the 
public the fact that Kansas judges, like judges in the other 49 states, inevitably 
make law.  Section III shows examples of Kansas judges making law.  Section 
IV concludes that honesty requires lawyers participating in the debate over 
judicial selection in the United States to forthrightly acknowledge that judges 
make law.  Lawyers who seek to defend the power advantage the Missouri 
Plan gives them over other citizens can honestly acknowledge that this is a 
power advantage in the selection of lawmakers and then explain why they 
believe a departure from the principle of one-person, one-vote is justified in the 
selection of these particular lawmakers.6 
II. THE STANDARD (“BALANCED REALIST”) VIEW THAT JUDGES 
INEVITABLY MAKE LAW 
A. Realism 101 
Judges are sometimes reluctant to acknowledge publicly that they 
inevitably make law.7  Why this reluctance?  Perhaps because the notion that 
judges should not “legislate from the bench”8 is popular among some segments 
of the public.9 
This popularity is surely due, in part, to the efforts of originalists10—those 
 
6. For example, they might argue that judicial independence is better protected by the 
Missouri Plan than alternative systems.  This argument is, I believe, is refuted by Ware, supra 
note 2, at 751 n.2, 769-74. 
7. Chief Justice Roberts, for example, likened judging to an umpire calling balls and strikes 
without, of course, playing the game.  See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. 
Roberts, Jr. to Be Chief Justice of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 109th Cong. 56 (2005) (statement of John G. Roberts) (“I will remember that it’s my 
job to call balls and strikes, and not to pitch or bat.”). 
8. See, e.g., President George W. Bush, Address to the Nation Announcing the Nomination 
of John G. Roberts, Jr., To Be an Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court, 41 
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1192, 1192 (July 19, 2005) (“[Judge Roberts] will strictly apply the 
Constitution and laws, not legislate from the bench.”); Todd E. Pettys, Judicial Retention 
Elections, The Rule of Law, and the Rhetorical Weaknesses of Consequentialism, 60 BUFF. L. 
REV. 69 (2012) (“prominent jurists do sometimes speak of adjudication as if it involved nothing 
more than the objective application of determinate rules”). 
9. Judge Richard Posner refers to “the allure [for judges] of being able to pose as a discerner 
rather than a creator of law, for that is the less controversial position and also flatters the laity’s 
ignorant expectation of what a judge is supposed to do.”  RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES 
THINK 262 (2008); James L. Gibson & Gregory A. Caldeira, Has Legal Realism Damaged the 
Legitimacy of the U.S. Supreme Court?, 45 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 195, 207 (2011) (finding that 
some Americans believe in “mechanical jurisprudence,” but that this belief is not particularly 
widespread); John M. Scheb II & William Lyons, The Myth of Legality and Public Evaluation of 
the Supreme Court, 81 SOC. SCI. Q. 928, 929 (2000) (“The myth of legality holds that cases are 
decided by the application of legal rules formulated and applied through a politically and 
philosophically neutral process of legal reasoning.  [T]he myth of legality is deeply ingrained in 
American culture.”). 
10. On the connection between originalist scholarship and popular notions about the 
illegitimacy of judicial lawmaking, see, e.g., Thomas B. Colby, The Sacrifice of the New 
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who contend that judges should interpret the U.S. Constitution’s text as it was 
originally understood, rather than according to evolving social norms.  For 
example, an organization that has done much to advance the cause of 
originalism, the Federalist Society, says “that it is emphatically the province 
and duty of the judiciary to say what the law is, not what it should be.”11  
Under this view, roughly stated, if evolving social norms warrant constitutional 
change then those changes should be enacted through amendments to the 
constitution’s text,12 rather than through the process of non-originalist judicial 
interpretation, which practically invites “activist” judges to convert their own 
policy preferences (political views) into law. 
Yet even Justice Scalia, perhaps the leading originalist, “has repeatedly 
stated that judges ‘make the law,’ resolving policy issues in the process.”13  
 
Originalism, 99 GEO. L.J. 713, 777-78 (2011) (quoting Rush Limbaugh’s praise for originalism); 
Justin Driver, Ignoble Specificities, THE NEW REPUBLIC, April 5, 2012, at 35 (“originalism has, 
in a shockingly short period of time, dramatically altered the terms of public constitutional 
discourse”). 
11. About Us, Our Background, THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY, http://www.fed-soc.org/ab 
outus/page/our-background (last visited Jan. 26, 2013).  See also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 
Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to 
say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and 
interpret that rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the courts must decide on the operation of 
each.”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (“The courts must declare the sense of 
the law; and if they should be disposed to exercise WILL instead of JUDGMENT, the 
consequence would equally be the substitution of their pleasure to that of the legislative body.”). 
12. See, e.g., Renee Lettow Lerner, Enlightenment Economics and the Framing of the U.S. 
Constitution, 35 HARV. J.L. & PUB POL’Y 37, 45 (2012) (“If the enumerated powers set out in the 
Constitution are thought to be too restrictive, the proper solution is to amend the Constitution, not 
to distort certain provisions beyond recognition.  Although amendments to the Constitution have 
become very rare, in earlier times--when judges and other officials and citizens took the language 
of the Constitution more seriously--amendments were more frequent.”). 
13. Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Distorting Slant in Quantitative Studies of Judging, 50 B.C. L. 
REV. 685, 710 (2009) (citing ANTONIN SCALIA, Common Law Courts in a Civil Law System, in A 
MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 6, 9, 12 (Amy Gutmann ed., 
1997)).  See also Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 784 (2002) (Scalia, J.) (“Not 
only do state-court judges possess the power to ‘make’ common law, but they have the immense 
power to shape the States’ constitutions as well. Which is precisely why the election of state 
judges became popular.” (internal citation omitted)); James B. Bean Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 
501 U.S. 529, 549 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (“I am not so naive (nor do I 
think our forebears were) as to be unaware that judges in a real sense ‘make’ law. But they make 
it as judges make it, which is to say as though they were ‘finding’ it-discerning what the law is, 
rather than decreeing what it is today changed to, or what it will tomorrow be. Of course this 
mode of action poses ‘difficulties of a ... practical sort,’ when courts decide to overrule prior 
precedent. But those difficulties are one of the understood checks upon judicial law-making; to 
eliminate them is to render courts substantially more free to ‘make new law,’ and thus to alter in a 
fundamental way the assigned balance of responsibility and power among the three branches.” 
(internal citation omitted) (emphasis in original)); ANTONIN SCALIA, Common-Law Courts in a 
Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and 
Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 10 (Amy Gutmann 
ed., 1997) (“It is only in this [20th] century, with the rise of legal realism, that we came to 
acknowledge that judges in fact ‘make’ the common law, and that each state has its own.”). 
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That judges make law does not much trouble Justice Scalia and other “great 
worriers over judicial usurpation” because they “typically draw a sharp 
distinction between constitutional judicial review and the common law 
process.”14
 
 In other words, activist judges injecting their policy preferences 
into constitutional law is deeply troubling to originalists, but activist judges 
injecting their policy preferences into the common law is not.15 
This distinction follows from the premise that law should be made 
democratically.  Democratic worries about judicial activism are far more 
severe when judges invoke a constitution to nullify statutes16 than when judges 
make common law, which can be overturned by statute.  The common law—
made by judges17—has served as the foundation of our law for centuries going 
back to England,18 but legislatures (now democratically-elected) can trump the 
 
14. Benjamin Ewing & Douglas A. Kysar, Prods and Pleas: Limited Government in an Era 
of Unlimited Harm, 121 YALE L.J. 350, 414 (2011). 
15. Of course, originalists—like others—engage in a variety of different debates about how 
judges should make the common law.  See infra note 20. 
16. The practice of judges trumping statutes raises the “counter-majoritarian difficulty” that 
“continues to be an obsession of constitutional theorists.”  Kenneth Ward, The Counter-
Majoritarian Difficulty and Legal Realist Perspectives of Law: The Place of Law in 
Contemporary Constitutional Theory, 18 J.L. & POL. 851, 851 (2002) (referring to “the counter-
majoritarian difficulty: how to justify judicial review, a non-democratic institution, in a 
government that derives its legitimacy from majority rule.”) (citing ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE 
LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS, 16-18 (2d ed. 
1986)).  The opposite problem—judges declining to hold a statute unconstitutional because the 
statute embodies the judge’s policy preferences—raises somewhat different concerns. 
17. It is routine to treat the “common law” and “judge-made law” as equivalents.  See 
Lueck v. Superior Court In & For Cochise Cnty., 469 P.2d 68, 70 (Ariz. 1970), superseded by 
statute on other grounds, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-612(C) (“When we find that the common 
law or ‘judge-made law’ is unjust or out of step with the times, we have no reluctance to change 
it.”); Butcher v. Superior Court, 139 Cal. App. 3d 58, 64, (1983) (“When it is determined that the 
common law or judge-made law is unjust or out of step with the times, we have no reluctance to 
change it.” (citing City of Glendale v. Bradshaw, 503 P.2d 803, 805 (Ariz. 1972)); Aluli v. 
Trusdell, 508 P.2d 1217, 1221 (Haw. 1973) (stating that “common law or judge-made law is the 
functional equivalent of statutory law”); Woodman v. Kera LLC, 785 N.W.2d 1, 21 (Mich. 2010) 
(“Given that the common law develops through judicial decisions, it has been described as 
‘judge-made law.’” (citing Placek v. Sterling Heights, 275 N.W.2d 511 (Mich. 1979)); Werner v. 
Hartfelder, 342 N.W.2d 520, 521 (Mich. 1984) (“the Court has recognized . . . that the common 
law is judge-made law . . . .”). 
18. See, e.g., Marie K. Pesando, 15A AM. JUR. 2D Common Law § 3 (2012) (“The common 
law migrated to this continent with the first English colonists, who claimed the system as their 
birthright; it continued in full force in the 13 original colonies until the American Revolution, at 
which time it was adopted by each of the states as well as the national government of the new 
nation. As new states were formed, they too adopted, by express provision or force of judicial 
decision, the principles of the common law insofar as applicable to their conditions.” (internal 
citations omitted)); William D. Bader, Some Thoughts on Blackstone, Precedent, and 
Originalism, 19 VT. L. REV. 5, 5 (noting that “the English common law was the seminal influence 
on the formative generation of American lawyers.”); NORMAN F. CANTOR, IMAGINING THE LAW: 
COMMON LAW AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM, 352-380 (1997) 
(explaining how the United States appropriated English common law as the basis of the its legal 
system); DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE AMERICANS: THE NATIONAL EXPERIENCE 35-42 (1965) 
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common law by enacting statutes.19  And the ultimate trump card, the 
Constitution, is made by the highest lawmaking authority in a democratic 
society, the People themselves.  Therefore, it is entirely consistent to want 
judges continuing to make the common law evolve to incorporate what the 
current generation of judges believes to be good policy, while forbidding 
judges from interpreting statutes and constitutions in that judge-emboldening 
way.20  In short, originalism’s concerns about judicial activism focus on 
 
(describing English common law as the foundation of America’s legal system).  For examples of 
reception statutes, see, e.g., Virginia General Convention Ordinance of May 6, 1776, ch. 5, § 6, 
1776 Va. Colony Laws 33, 37 (“And be it further ordained, that the common law of England, all 
statutes and acts of Parliament made in aid of the common law prior to the fourth year of the reign 
of King James the first [1607], and which are of a general nature, not local to that kingdom, 
together with the several acts of the General Assembly of this colony now in force, so far as the 
same may consist with the several ordinances, declarations and resolutions of the General 
Convention, shall be the rule of decision, and shall be considered as in full force, until the same 
shall be altered by the legislative power of this colony.”); MO. REV. STAT. § 1.010 (2000) (“The 
common law of England and all statutes and acts of parliament made prior to the fourth year of 
the reign of James the First, of a general nature, which are local to that kingdom and not 
repugnant to or inconsistent with the Constitution of the United States, the constitution of this 
state, or the statute laws in force for the time being, are the rule of action and decision in this 
state, any custom or usage to the contrary notwithstanding”). 
19. See, e.g., Marie K. Pesando, 15A AM. JUR. 2D Common Law § 10 (2012) (“The English 
common law has been adopted as the basis of jurisprudence in all the states of the Union with the 
exception of Louisiana, where the civil law prevails in civil matters. The common law prevails 
generally throughout the United States, except as modified, changed, or repealed by statute or 
constitutional provisions of an individual state”); John F. Duffy, Administrative Common Law in 
Judicial Review, 77 TEX. L. REV. 113, 116 (1998) (“[L]egislators are the lawgivers ... [and so] 
courts deciding statutory cases are bound to follow commands and policies embodied in the 
enacted text—commands and policies the courts did not create and cannot change.”); Richard A. 
Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes and the Constitution, 
37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 179, 189 (1986) (“In our system of government the framers of 
statutes... are the superiors of the judges. The framers communicate orders to the judges through 
legislative texts. . . . If the orders are clear, the judges must obey them.”); Cass R. Sunstein, 
Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 415 (1989) (“According to 
the most prominent conception of the role of courts in statutory construction, judges are agents or 
servants of the legislature. . . . The judicial task is to discern and apply a judgment made by 
others, most notably the legislature.”). 
20. See ANTONIN SCALIA, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United 
States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF 
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 12 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) (praising the 
common law method: “It has proven to be a good method of developing the law in many fields — 
and perhaps the very best method.”); . at 38 (defending “original meaning” constitutional 
interpretation against “The Living Constitution”). 
The ascendant school of constitutional interpretation affirms the existence of what is 
called The Living Constitution, a body of law that (unlike normal statutes) grows and 
changes from age to age, in order to meet the needs of a changing society.  And it is the 
judges who determine those needs and “find” that changing law.  Seems familiar, 
doesn’t it?  Yes, it is the common law returned, but infinitely more powerful than what 
the old common law ever pretended to be, for now it trumps even the statutes of 
democratic legislatures. 
Id. at 38. 
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constitutional and statutory cases and are no obstacle to acknowledging that 
judges inevitably make the common law.21 
The acknowledgment that judges inevitably make the common law 
became routine with the growth, and then dominance, of legal realism, over the 
course of the last century.22  While the Legal Realists had many, and 
sometimes divergent, views, their “most basic insight” is “that common-law 
judges make public policy in deciding cases no less than legislators do in 
enacting laws.”23  Like most everyone else, Justice Scalia says that it was with 
 
21. Of course, originalists—like others—engage in a variety of different debates about how 
judges should make the common law.  One of these debates is the pace at which the common law 
should evolve.  Perhaps originalist judges tend to be conservative and perhaps conservative 
judges generally have a Burkean or Hayekian respect for longstanding common law as 
embodying the accumulated wisdom gained from many generations of trial-and-error experience.  
See, e.g., Todd J. Zywicki & Anthony B. Sanders, Posner, Hayek, and the Economic Analysis of 
Law, 93 IOWA L. REV. 559, 582 (2008) (“Hayek shares the traditional view that cases are merely 
illustrations of more abstract legal principles; cases are not ‘law’ in and of themselves. The 
independent efforts of many judges deciding many cases over time generates legal principles, and 
it is those principles that matter, not the constituent cases themselves. The legal principles that 
emerge from this implicit collaboration among many judges reflect greater wisdom and consensus 
than any individual judge deciding any individual case. Thus, it is that Hayek characterizes the 
common law as a spontaneous order in the same way that the market is a spontaneous order.”)  
Perhaps such judges tend to subordinate their own policy preferences to the policies already 
embodied in the common law and thus hew closely to precedents, resulting in a common law that 
evolves slowly and cautiously.  In contrast, progressive judges may tend to see longstanding 
common law less positively and thus be more willing to replace it with new law reflecting the 
policy preferences of current judges, resulting in a common law that evolves more rapidly. 
22. “In the early part of the twentieth century, the hard-headed and clear-eyed Justice 
Holmes, the leader of the legal realists, insisted that it was a myth that judges decided 
controversial cases by ‘finding’ rather than making the law. That contention was a step in the 
direction of a more mature and honest legal system.” Lino A. Graglia, Originalism and the 
Constitution: Does Originalism Always Provide the Answer?, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 73, 
84-85 (2011); see also Charles Gardner Geyh, Straddling the Fence Between Truth and Pretense: 
The Role of Law and Preference in Judicial Decision Making and the Future of Judicial 
Independence, 22 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 435, 438 (2008) (“The legal realism 
movement of the 1920s challenged the traditional view that judges were essentially value-neutral 
automatons who mechanically divined and applied the true meaning of the law. Rather, legal 
realists asserted that judges are influenced by their education, upbringing, ambitions, experiences, 
and values to no less an extent than anyone else.”); Frederick Schauer, Do Cases Make Bad 
Law?, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 883, 886 (2006) (“Now, having for generations bathed in the teachings 
of Holmes and the Realists, we heed their lessons. We no longer deny the creative and forward-
looking aspect of common law decisionmaking [sic], and we routinely brand those who do as 
‘formalists.’ It is thus no longer especially controversial to insist that common law judges make 
law.”). 
23. David L. Franklin, Justice Ginsburg’s Common-Law Federalism, 43 NEW ENG. L. REV. 
751, 757 (2009); see also George D. Brown, Political Judges and Popular Justice: A 
Conservative Victory or a Conservative Dilemma?, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1543, 1601 (2008) 
(“Common law courts are certainly engaged in the business of making law and policy. . . . 
[A]nyone who contends otherwise is falling into the trap of magisterial visions of the judiciary 
that have been discredited by legal realism and the work of political scientists.”) (citing Michael 
R. Dimino, Pay No Attention to That Man Behind the Robe: Judicial Elections, the First 
Amendment, and Judges as Politicians, 21 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 301, 357-67 (2003)); David 
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the 20th Century rise of legal realism “that we came to acknowledge that 
judges in fact ‘make’ the common law.”24 
Realism about judicial lawmaking is not, however, confined to the 
common law.25  As nearly everyone (including Justice Scalia26) recognizes, 
statutory language is sometimes vague or ambiguous.27  Such statutes do not 
 
Luban, Justice Holmes and the Metaphysics of Judicial Restraint, 44 DUKE L.J. 449, 504 (1994) 
(“[T]he fundamental insight of [Holmes’s] legal realism is that judges can make and unmake law 
(though they customarily deny that this is what they are doing) . . . .”); John Hasnas, The 
Depoliticization of Law, 9 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 529, 543 (2008) (“[T]he legal realists 
established that the rules of law do not bind common law judges to decide controversial appellate 
cases one way rather than another. The existence of contradictory rules of law and construction 
and the open textured nature of legal language always provide the judge sufficient leeway to 
arrive at the legal conclusion that he or she believes to be correct—something that is determined 
by his or her pre-existing moral and ideological commitments.”). 
24. “It is only in this [20th] century, with the rise of legal realism, that we came to 
acknowledge that judges in fact ‘make’ the common law, and that each state has its own.” 
Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal 
Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL 
COURTS AND THE LAW 10 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).  Brian Tamanaha’s more detailed and 
nuanced histories suggest that realism actually predated the Realists, that is, 19th Century judges 
were aware that they were making law.  See generally Brian Z. Tamanaha, Balanced Realism on 
Judging, 44 VAL. U. L. REV. 1243 (2010); BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, BEYOND THE FORMALIST–
REALIST DIVIDE: THE ROLE OF POLITICS IN JUDGING 18-20 (2009) (in the late 19
th
 Century, 
“[e]ven judges openly acknowledged that they made law.”); Brian Z. Tamanaha, Understanding 
Legal Realism, 87 TEX. L. REV. 731 (2009). 
25. “The Core Claim of Legal Realism consists of the following descriptive thesis about 
judicial decision-making: judges respond primarily to the stimulus of facts. Put less formally—
but also somewhat less accurately—the Core Claim of Realism is that judges reach decisions 
based on what they think would be fair on the facts of the case, rather than on the basis of the 
applicable rules of law.” Brian Leiter, Rethinking Legal Realism: Toward a Naturalized 
Jurisprudence, 76 TEX. L. REV. 267, 275 (1997). 
26. See W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 100-01 (1991) (Scalia, J.), 
superseded by statute on other grounds, 42 U.S.C. § 1988(c) (2000) (“Where a statutory term 
presented to us for the first time is ambiguous, we construe it to contain that permissible meaning 
which fits most logically and comfortably into the body of both previously and subsequently 
enacted law. We do so not because that precise accommodative meaning is what the lawmakers 
must have had in mind (how could an earlier Congress know what a later Congress would 
enact?), but because it is our role to make sense rather than nonsense out of the corpus juris.”) 
(internal citations omitted); BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 547 (1994) (Scalia, J.) 
(“the ‘plain meaning’ of [the statutory language] ‘reasonably equivalent value’ continues to leave 
unanswered the one question central to this case, wherein the ambiguity lies: What is a foreclosed 
property worth? Obviously, until that is determined, we cannot know whether the value received 
in exchange for foreclosed property is ‘reasonably equivalent.’ We have considered three possible 
answers to this question-fair market value.”) (parenthetical omitted); Antonin Scalia, The Rule of 
Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1183 (1989) (“One can hardly imagine a 
prescription more vague than the Sherman Act’s prohibition of contracts, combinations or 
conspiracies in restraint of trade.”). 
27. On the distinction between vague and ambiguous, see E. Allan Farnsworth, 
“Dmeaning” in the Law of Contracts, 76 YALE L.J. 939, 953 (1967) (“Ambiguity, properly 
defined, is an entirely distinct concept from that of vagueness. A word that may or may not be 
applicable to marginal objects is vague. But a word may also have two entirely different 
connotations so that it may be applied to an object and be at the same time both clearly 
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compel a single result in each case that might arise, as reasonable people can 
disagree about the best interpretation of the statute and, therefore, the best 
result of the particular case.  “The legal realists saw the interpretation of 
statutory ambiguities as necessarily involving judgments of policy and 
principle.  They insisted that when courts understand statutes to mean one 
thing rather than another, they use judgments of their own, at least in genuinely 
hard cases.”28  This realist view that statutory interpretation often involves 
“substantial judicial discretion” and therefore constitutes “judicial lawmaking, 
not lawfinding,” had by the 1950s, “become deeply rooted.”29 
These realist points about judicial lawmaking in statutory interpretation 
apply as well to judicial lawmaking in constitutional interpretation.  That 
constitutional provisions are sometimes vague or ambiguous is acknowledged 
by just about everyone, including prominent originalists like Randy Barnett, 
who explains as follows. 
[O]riginalism is a method of constitutional interpretation that 
identifies the meaning of the text as its public meaning at the time of 
its enactment.  The text of the Constitution may say a lot, but it does 
not say everything one needs to know to resolve all possible cases 
and controversies.  Originalism is not a theory of what to do when 
original meaning runs out.  This is not a bug; it is a feature.  Were a 
constitution too specific, its original meaning probably would 
become outdated very quickly.  A constitution with a degree of 
vagueness delegates some decisions of application to the judgment of 
future actors, provided these decisions do not conflict with the 
information that is provided by the text.30 
 
appropriate and inappropriate, as the word ‘light’ may be when applied to dark feathers. Such a 
word is ambiguous.”). 
28. Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond Marbury: The Executive’s Power to Say What the Law Is, 115 
YALE L.J. 2580, 2591 (2006).  The classic is perhaps Karl Llewellyn’s legal-realist critique of 
statutory interpretation showing that the canons of construction are often inconsistent.  See Karl 
N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decisions and the Rules or Canons About 
How Statutes Are To Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395 (1950); see also M. R. COHEN, The 
Process of Judicial Legislation, in LAW AND THE SOCIAL ORDER 112-13, 121-24 (1933), 
reprinted in COHEN AND COHEN’S READINGS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 241 
(Philip Shuchman ed., 2d ed., 1979) (“[N]ot only is the common law changed from time to time 
by judicial decisions . . . the courts also make our statute law; for it is the court’s interpretation of 
the meaning of a statute that constitutes the law.”). 
29. Philip P. Frickey, From the Big Sleep to the Big Heat: The Revival of Theory in 
Statutory Interpretation, 77 MINN. L. REV. 241, 248 (1992) (“Because neither statutory text nor 
legislative intent was universally determinate and confining, the legal realists insisted that 
statutory interpretation often involved substantial judicial discretion and constituted judicial 
lawmaking, not law finding. . . . By the 1950s, the legal realists’ critique of interpretive formalism 
had become deeply rooted.”);  Paul D. Carrington & Adam R. Long, The Independence and 
Democratic Accountability of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 30 CAP. U. L. REV. 455, 469 (2002), 
(“Although there was a time in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries when many 
American lawyers and some citizens deluded themselves with the belief that judges could be 
trained to be professional technicians interpreting statutes and constitutions without regard to 
their political consequences, there is virtually no one who thinks that today.”). 
30. Randy E. Barnett, Interpretation and Construction, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 65, 69-
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To the same effect are the writings of another well-known originalist, Steven 
Calabresi,31 Chairman of the Federalist Society.32 After noting that the United 
States Constitution consists not only of rules, but also of standards and 
principles,33 Professor Calabresi says “[a]dopters use rules because they want 
to limit discretion; they use standards or principles because they want to 
channel politics but delegate the details to future generations.”34  While rules 
are relatively determinate, with respect to at least some standards, “different 
reasonable constitutional interpreters will differ on how the standard should be 
applied.”35 
Do these differences among reasonable constitutional interpreters (judges) 
correlate with the judges’ policy preferences?  The consensus is that they do, 
especially at the supreme court level.  Most everyone “recognize[s] that the 
constitutional opinions of Supreme Court Justices are affected by their political 
proclivities.”36  Even Justice Scalia acknowledges that high-court judges have 
“immense power to shape” constitutions.37  As Suzanna Sherry puts it, “[s]ince 
at least the time of the Legal Realists, lawyers, judges, and legal scholars have 
recognized that judges do make law, especially in cases that are difficult or 
ambiguous enough to require Supreme Court adjudication.”38  In sum, “[t]he 
insights of legal realism have important consequences for constitutional law.  
If legal doctrine can no longer be counted on to insulate judicial decisions from 
the normative preferences of the judges who render them, the constitutional 
 
70 (2011). 
31. See Steven G. Calabresi & Julia T. Rickert, Originalism and Sex Discrimination, 90 
Tex. L. Rev. 1, 16 (2011) (referring to the “undeniable ambiguity” of Section 1 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment); Steven G. Calabresi & Sarah E. Agudo, Individual Rights Under State 
Constitutions when the Fourteenth Amendment was Ratified in 1868: What Rights are Deeply 
Rooted in American History and Tradition?, 87 TEX. L. REV. 7, 81 (2008) (“One ambiguity of the 
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause is whether it forbids all disproportionate punishments or 
only a certain set of punishments that were thought to be cruel and unusual 200 years ago, like 
drawing and quartering.”); Steven G. Calabresi, Text, Precedent, and the Constitution: Some 
Originalist and Normative Arguments for Overruling Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
Pennsylvania v. Casey, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 311, 328 (2005) (stating that precedent should be 
given determinative weight in constitutional cases only where “the text is vague and all three 
branches of the federal government are content with” governing precedent). 
32. About Us, Board of Directors, THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY, http://www.fed-soc.org/abou 
tus/page/board-of-directors (last visited Jan. 26, 2013). 
33. Steven G. Calabresi & Livia Fine, Two Cheers for Professor Balkin’s Originalism, 103 
NW. U. L. REV. 663, 672 (2009). 
34. Id. 
35. Id. at 673.  This reasonable-people-can-disagree point is even stronger with respect to 
constitutional principles, which are even less determinate than constitutional standards. 
36. Jack Goldsmith & Daryl Levinson, Law for States: International Law, Constitutional 
Law, Public Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1791, 1834 (2009). 
37. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 784 (2002) (“Not only do state-
court judges possess the power to ‘make’ common law, but they have the immense power to 
shape the States’ constitutions as well. Which is precisely why the election of state judges became 
popular.” (internal citation omitted)). 
38. Suzanna Sherry, The Four Pillars of Constitutional Doctrine, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 969, 
974 (2011). 
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law that is being announced by judges will ultimately be shaped by the 
normative values of the judges themselves.”39 
B. Balanced Realism and the Multifaceted Role of a Judge 
To recap, it is a “truism that judges make law.”40  That “we are all realists 
now” is so thoroughly accepted as to be a cliche.41 
Of course, this does not mean that each branch of government—
legislative, executive and judicial—plays an equally large role in making law 
(as distinguished from applying and enforcing law).  As noted above, the 
common law is an important realm for judicial lawmaking, but whatever law 
judges make in this realm can be overturned by the other two branches, 
through enactment of a statute.  And even when the other branches leave an 
area of lawmaking to the judiciary, the common law process tends to minimize 
the extent to which any individual judge’s policy preferences become law.  The 
common law evolves one case at a time and following precedent is the norm, 
so major changes in the common law tend to require sustained consensus of 
many judges across time.42  In contrast, major changes in statutory and 
 
39. Girardeau A. Spann, Constitutionalization, 49 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 709, 714 (2005). 
40. “Post-realist jurisprudence must depart from the truism that judges make law and begin 
instead with the question of how they make law.” See Neil Duxbury, Faith in Reason: The 
Process Tradition in American Jurisprudence, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 601, 636 (1993). 
41. Leiter, supra note 25, at 267; see also Charles Gardner Geyh, Straddling the Fence 
Between Truth and Pretense: The Role of Law and Preference in Judicial Decision Making and 
the Future of Judicial Independence, 22 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 435, 438, 444 
(2008) (“In an age when ‘[w]e are all legal realists now,’ it is too late in the day to pretend that 
when judges adjudicate disputes between adversaries, both of whom support their positions with 
credible-seeming legal arguments, the value preferences of the judges never factor into the 
choices they make.”); Thomas W. Merrill, High-Level, “Tenured” Lawyers, 61 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 83, 88 (1998) (“We live in a post-Legal Realist Age, when most legal 
commentators take it for granted that law cannot be disentangled from politics and that legal 
judgment is driven by the political beliefs of the decision maker.”); Gary Peller, The Metaphysics 
of American Law, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1151, 1152 (1985) (“It is a commonplace that law is 
‘political.’”); Jerry Elmer, Legal Realism, Legal Formalism and the D’Oench Duhme Doctrine: A 
Perspective on R.I. Depositors Econ. Prot. Corp. v. NFD, 53 R.I. B.J. 9, 11 (2004) (“Today, we 
are all Legal Realists. Being Realists, we understand two things: that judges do make law, not just 
find it, and that public policy considerations may properly enter into a judge’s deliberations.”); 
MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960, 169-212 (1992) 
(legal realism’s most important legacy was its challenge to the notion that law has an autonomous 
role separate from politics); Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic 
Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 274 (1998) (“[T]he program of unmasking law as 
politics [was] central to American Legal Realism . . . .”). 
42. Randy E. Barnett, Foreword: Judicial Conservatism v. A Principled Judicial Activism, 
10 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 273, 286-87 (1987) (“The judicially-driven common law system 
develops substantive standards that are as much a product of collective wisdom as the statutory 
output of Congress, perhaps more.  With the many real constraints a common law system places 
on judges, it is perhaps astounding that any evolution of law actually occurs, that creative judicial 
‘lawmaking’ (beyond individual cases) exists at all.  Maybe this is why the progress of the 
common law has sometimes seemed to be so painfully slow.”); GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON 
LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 4 (1982) (“The incremental nature of common law adjudication 
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regulatory law can occur quickly, and this is especially likely to occur when 
the same political party gains control of the legislative and executive 
branches.43 
Shifting our focus from common law cases to statutory and regulatory 
cases, we again see that realism about judicial lawmaking does not imply that 
the content of legal rules is determined as much by judges’ policy preferences 
as by the policy preferences of those leading the other two branches of 
government.  Judicial deference to the enactments of the legislative and 
executive branches is the norm44, and judicial interpretation of these 
enactments generally occurs in the context of adjudicating a dispute that has 
already arisen between particular parties45 so this fact-specific context tends to 
minimize the extent to which any individual judge’s policy preferences 
 
meant that no single judge could ultimately change the law, and a series of judges could only do 
so over time and in response to changed events or to changed attitudes in the people.”); Deborah 
A. Widiss, Undermining Congressional Overrides: The Hydra Problem in Statutory 
Interpretation, 90 TEX. L. REV. 859, 867 (2012) (“[N]otwithstanding respect for precedent, 
common law courts reconsider prior precedents in response to changing needs or evolving norms; 
often, this occurs gradually as prior decisions are distinguished and new decisions slowly 
accumulate until ultimately a high court announces a new rule.”); Andrew J. Wistrich, The 
Evolving Temporality of Lawmaking, 44 CONN. L. REV. 737, 781 (2012) (“While common law 
decision-making proceeds incrementally . . . statutory change, though more difficult to achieve, 
can be avulsive.”).  
43. “Social scientists have found that important and noteworthy laws are far more likely to 
emerge when the same political party controls both Congress and the executive branch; a divided 
government, in contrast, impairs the lawmakers’ ability to enact consequential law.” Lee Epstein, 
Barry Friedman, & Nancy Staudt, On the Capacity of the Roberts Court to Generate 
Consequential Precedent, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1299, 1332 n.39 (2008).  Judge-made law can change 
significantly in the year or two following a change in the political party or interest group in 
control of the judicial branch.  See Stephen J. Ware, Money, Politics and Judicial Decisions: A 
Case Study of Arbitration Law in Alabama, 15 J.L. & POL. 645, 656-60 & n.78 (1999) (1998 shift 
in Alabama Supreme Court’s majority from Democrats receiving campaign contributions 
primarily from plaintiffs’ trial lawyers to Republicans receiving campaign contributions primarily 
from businesses “marked a major turning point. Cases that plaintiffs had previously won five-
votes-to-four now turned into defendant victories by the same margin”); Id. at 684 (“[A]rbitration 
cases indicate that the court often splits along predictable, and highly partisan, lines.  Justices 
whose campaigns are funded by plaintiffs’ lawyers are all Democrats and oppose arbitration, 
while justices whose campaigns are funded by business are nearly all Republicans and favor 
arbitration. There is a strong correlation between a justice’s source of campaign funds and how 
that justice votes in arbitration cases.”); id. at 685 (“Arbitration law in Alabama seems to have no 
doctrinal integrity that survives the vicissitudes of the interest group battle. This law is indeed 
politics, in a very real and direct sense. This law provides evidence for the strong strain of Legal 
Realism which ‘contends that law is politics through and through and that judges exercise broad 
discretionary authority.’”). 
44. See supra note 19. 
45. See, e.g., George D. Brown, Political Judges and Popular Justice: A Conservative 
Victory or a Conservative Dilemma?, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1543, 1560, 1603-04 (2008); 
Paul Carrington, Judicial Independence and Democratic Accountability in Highest State Courts, 
61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 79, 91-92 (1998) ("A fundamental difference exists between 
judicial and legislative offices . . . because judges decide the rights and duties of individuals even 
when they are making policy[.]”). 
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become law.46 
In sum, the realist truism that “judges make law” is very different from a 
claim that all judicial decisions consist entirely of the judge’s political views.  
A “balanced realism,” to use Brian Tamanaha’s appealing label,47 recognizes 
both that judges’ policy preferences have little or no influence on many 
judicial decisions and that judges’ policy preferences have a significant 
influence on other judicial decisions.  Empirical studies tend to support this 
balanced view.48  As Tamanaha puts it, “[i]n a well-functioning legal system, 
 
46. James B. Bean Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 549 (1991) (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (“I am not so naive (nor do I think our forebears were) as to be unaware that judges in 
a real sense “make” law. But they make it as judges make it, which is to say as though they were 
‘finding’ it-discerning what the law is, rather than decreeing what it is today changed to, or what 
it will tomorrow be. Of course this mode of action poses ‘difficulties of a ... practical sort,’ when 
courts decide to overrule prior precedent. But those difficulties are one of the understood checks 
upon judicial law-making; to eliminate them is to render courts substantially more free to ‘make 
new law,’ and thus to alter in a fundamental way the assigned balance of responsibility and power 
among the three branches.”). 
47. Brian Z. Tamanaha, Balanced Realism on Judging, 44 VAL. U. L. REV. 1243, 1258-59 
(2010). 
48. As Charles Gardner Geyh summarizes, “influences on judicial decision-making are 
complex and multivariate.” CHARLES GARDNER GEYH, WHAT’S LAW GOT TO DO WITH IT? 
WHAT JUDGES DO, WHY THEY DO IT, AND WHAT’S AT STAKE 3 (2011).  Accord Charles 
Gardner Geyh, Can the Rule of Law Survive Judicial Politics?, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 191, 206-14 
(2012) (summarizing empirical studies of judicial behavior by political scientists and legal 
scholars); see also Frank B. Cross, Decisionmaking in the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals, 91 
CALIF. L. REV. 1457, 1482 (2003) (“The weight of the empirical evidence clearly reveals some 
role for ideology in judicial decisionmaking.  As Charles Songer and others have articulated, 
‘[t]he general picture presented by these studies is clear: across a wide variety of courts and issue 
areas, Democratic judges are more likely to support the liberal position in case outcomes than 
their Republican colleagues.’ The evidence for the political model is ‘abundant and convincing.’ 
But while the empirical evidence on the political model may conflict with the legal model, it is 
not so strong as to demonstrate that the legal model has no practical importance.”); Ward 
Farnsworth, Signatures of Ideology: The Case of the Supreme Court’s Criminal Docket, 104 
MICH. L. REV. 67, 71 (2005) (“The better interpretation [of the data] is that every case provokes 
competition between a justice’s preferences on the one hand and the legal materials on the other. 
When the legal materials are very strong, they can produce unanimity despite conflicting 
preferences. But when the legal materials aren’t so strong—when they don’t point to a clear 
answer and leave room for discretionary judgment—the competition is won by the justice’s 
underlying preferences and views of the world.”); Gregory C. Sisk & Michael Heise, Judges and 
Ideology: Public and Academic Debates About Statistical Measures, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 743. 771-
72 (2005) (“[W]hile the basic empirical finding that political ideology explains some of the 
variation among judges in reaching an answer in certain categories of court cases cannot be 
denied, neither should the influence of the ideological variable be overstated.  Review of recent 
studies in terms of the actual margin of difference between judges of different political 
associations suggests the effect of this variable is more often moderate than large.”); Corey 
Rayburn Yung, Judged by the Company You Keep: An Empirical Study of the Ideologies of 
Judges on the United States Courts of Appeals, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1133, 1143 (2010) (“Even the 
most ardent supporters of strategic and legal models of decision making acknowledge that a 
portion of decisions are best explained by ideology.”). 
Caution about empirical studies of judges’ ideologies, attitudes and policy preferences is 
warranted because  
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judges largely abide by and apply the law, there are practice-related, social and 
institutional factors that constrain judges and judges render generally 
predictable decisions consistent with the law.”49  However, it is equally true 
“that judges sometimes make choices, that they can manipulate legal rules and 
precedents, and that they sometimes are influenced by their political views and 
personal biases.”50  Tamanaha explains that, “the legal realists viewed judging 
in similarly balanced terms. They did not assert that judges routinely 
manipulated the law to produce desired outcomes.”51  As Judge Richard Posner 
notes, successful reconciliation of legal realism “with the undoubted fact that 
there is a fair degree of predictability” in the law occurred at least as long as 
ago as 1960.52 
To reiterate, the realist truism that “judges make law” is very different 
from a claim that all judicial decisions consist entirely of the judge’s political 
views.  Perhaps most, or even all, judges usually succeed in subordinating their 
policy preferences to those of some other lawmaker, such as the legislature that 
enacted the relevant statute53 or the higher court that decided the relevant case 
 
[t]hese beliefs, like any other beliefs, are concealed inside the believer’s head. . . . 
Because a judge’s attitude can never be known to anyone but the judge, political 
scientists have had to use other data as proxies for ‘attitude.’ Such data include: party 
affiliation, background experiences and social characteristics, prior votes, speeches, 
and newspaper editorials.   
Stephen J. Ware, Money, Politics and Judicial Decisions: A Case Study of Arbitration Law in 
Alabama, 15 J.L. & POL. 645, 648 (1999).  Therefore, it is more careful to say that judges’ rulings 
in a particular category of cases correlate with the judge’s political party, for example, than with 
the judge’s ideology or policy preferences.  See generally Joshua B. Fischman & David S. Law, 
What is Judicial Ideology, and How Should We Measure It?, 29 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 133 
(2009). 
Different measures of ideology vary greatly in their ability to explain judicial voting, 
and ... the choice of one measurement approach over another can significantly 
influence the findings that scholars reach. If empirical scholarship involving the 
concept of judicial ideology is to realize its scientific potential or gain greater 
acceptance from a wider audience, those of us who produce such scholarship must 
learn both to speak clearly about what is meant by “judicial ideology,” and to give 
careful thought to the methods that are employed to measure it. 
Id. at 213-14.  On the challenges of measuring case outcomes, see Tonja Jacobi & Matthew Sag, 
Taking the Measure of Ideology: Empirically Measuring Supreme Court Cases, 98 GEO. L.J. 1 
(2009). 
49. Tamanaha, supra note 47, at 1258-59. 
50. Id.  See also BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, BEYOND THE FORMALIST-REALIST DIVIDE: THE 
ROLE OF POLITICS IN JUDGING 6 (2010). 
51. See also Leiter, supra note 25, at 268 (“it is . . . quite misleading to think of Realism as 
committed to the claim that judges exercise ‘unfettered’ discretion”); id. at 273 (“the Realists, 
unlike [Critical Legal Studies] writers, did not generally view the law as ‘globally’ indeterminate, 
that is, as indeterminate in all cases. To the contrary, Realists were mainly concerned to point out 
the indeterminacy that exists in those cases that are actually litigated, especially those that make it 
to the stage of appellate review—a far smaller class of cases, and one where indeterminacy in law 
is far less surprising.”). 
52. POSNER, supra note 9, at 213 (citing KARL LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW 
TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS (1960)). 
53. See sources cited supra note 19. 
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law precedents.54  However, even if most cases are unaffected by the judge’s 
political views, the standard, realist view that “judges make law” nevertheless 
rests securely on the premise that some judicial decisions—perhaps the “hard 
cases” (Ronald Dworkin55) or the “penumbral cases” (H.L.A. Hart56)—are, to 
some extent, affected by judges’ political views.57  Only someone far outside 
the mainstream of our country’s 20th and 21st Century legal thought would 
seriously dispute that premise.  “In a post-realist age,” as Charles Gardner 
Geyh says, “the ideological orientation of judicial aspirants matters.”58 
To put it another way, it is well established that judging has both a 
professional/technical side and a political/lawmaking side.59  The 
 
54. See infra notes 61-62 and accompanying text. 
55. Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1060 (1975) (defining “hard 
cases” as those in which “no settled rule dictates a decision either way”). 
56. H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593 
(1958). 
A legal rule forbids you to take a vehicle into the public park. Plainly this forbids an 
automobile, but what about bicycles, roller skates, toy automobiles? . . . [T]he general 
words we use—like “vehicle” in the case I consider— must have some standard 
instance in which no doubts are felt about its application. There must be a core of 
settled meaning, but there will be, as well, a penumbra of debatable cases in which 
words are neither obviously applicable nor obviously ruled out. 
* * * 
We may call the problems which arise outside the hard core of standard instances or 
settled meaning “problems of the penumbra”; they are always with us . . . . 
Id. at 607. 
57. See, e.g., Todd E. Pettys, Judicial Retention Elections, The Rule of Law, and the 
Rhetorical Weaknesses of Consequentialism, 60 BUFF. L. REV. 69 (2012). 
There are, of course, instances in which judges do little more than apply the plain 
requirements of the law, as when a case calls for the application of unambiguous 
thresholds (like ages and speed limits) or when a dispute plainly falls within a well-
developed line of uncontested and homogeneous precedent.  [In contrast,] matters like 
abortion, same-sex marriage, and the rights of criminal defendants [are] matters 
governed by legal texts whose open- ended wording is reasonably susceptible to 
competing interpretations.  When the relevant legal texts speak at a high level of 
abstraction, or when the identification of the relevant legal texts is itself contested, 
judges must—by necessity—exercise interpretive discretion.  This does not mean that 
judges are free to select any outcomes and rationales that suit their fancy. Rather, it 
means that in cases of the sort that are likely to trigger public controversy, there often 
are multiple ways in which a judge who conscientiously applies the interpretive 
conventions of the legal profession could resolve the given dispute. 
Id. at 101-02 (internal quotation marks omitted).  See also Adam M. Samaha, On Law’s 
Tiebreakers, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 1661, 1710 (2010) (“[I]t is conventional wisdom to believe that 
many interpretive issues are resolved by conventional legal argument while a more difficult set of 
controversies—perhaps made unavoidable by selection effects in litigation—are influenced by 
judicial discretion or ideology.”). 
58. Charles Gardner Geyh, Judicial Selection Reconsidered: A Plea for Radical 
Moderation, 35 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 623, 638 (2012). 
59. For this reason, “When discussing appointments to the Bench, we distinguish different 
kinds of desirable characteristics judges should possess.  We value their knowledge of the law 
and their skills in interpreting laws and in arguing in ways showing their legal experience and 
expertise.  We also value their wisdom and understanding of human nature, their moral 
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professional/technical side may include applying to the facts of a case, law 
made by someone other than the judge (e.g., a legislature,) as well as running a 
courtroom and so forth.  But judging also involves lawmaking, the political 
side highlighted by the Legal Realists.  “Just as it is one-sided to denigrate the 
technical, lawyerly side of judging by claiming that judges are simply 
‘politicians in robes,’ it is also one-sided to denigrate the lawmaking side of 
judging by claiming that the political views of a judge are irrelevant to his or 
her job as a judge.”60 
The political/lawmaking side of judging looms larger, the higher the 
court.  In other words, the extent to which (inevitable) judicial lawmaking 
allows judges to inject their political views into law rises, the higher the court.  
Trial judges play less of a lawmaking role than appellate judges, especially 
supreme court justices, simply because court systems are hierarchical and trial 
courts are at the bottom.61 The legal rulings of trial courts can be reversed, de 
novo, by appellate courts.62  In contrast, appellate courts are often the final 
word, as a practical matter, on issues of law.  Appellate courts’ common law 
rulings can be overturned by statute, but enacting any legislation requires 
overcoming the inertia of a legislature with many issues competing for its 
attention.  Similarly, overcoming that inertia is also needed to overturn judicial 
interpretations of statutes.  This inertia point is even stronger with respect to 
judicial decisions interpreting constitutions.  These decisions can be 
overturned, not by statute, but by constitutional amendment.  Unless and until 
 
sensibility, their enlightened approach, etc.” JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW:  ESSAYS ON 
LAW AND MORALITY 48 (1979). 
60. Ware, supra note 2, at 757 (citing David R. Stras & Ryan W. Scott, Navigating the New 
Politics of Judicial Appointments, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1869, 1871 (2008) (describing “two 
popular narratives about the way Supreme Court Justices decide cases: one that treats Justices as 
neutral and nonpolitical ‘umpires,’ and another that views Justices as pervasively ideological 
‘politicians’ in robes.”); Roy A. Schotland, To the Endangered Species List, Add: Nonpartisan 
Judicial Elections, 39 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1397, 1419 (2003) (referring “to the cynical view 
that judges are merely ‘Politicians in Judges’ Robes . . . .”)); see also DANIEL A. FARBER & 
SUZANNA SHERRY, JUDGMENT CALLS: PRINCIPLE AND POLITICS IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 39 
(2009) (rejecting “the ‘if not the heavens, then the abyss’ syndrome” in which judges are subject 
either to “complete constraint” or “boundless leeway”). 
61. “Trial judges tend to confront more ‘easy cases,’ with less ideological contestation, than 
appellate judges do, and trial judges’ decisions have less precedential impact. As a result, their 
opinions are somewhat less ideological than those of appellate courts.”  Frank B. Cross, 
Decisionmaking in the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 1457, 1481 n.162 
(2003). 
62. See, e.g., AT&T Mobility L.L.C. v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1752 (2011) 
(“Questions of law are reviewed de novo and questions of fact for clear error.”); Estate of Holl v. 
C.I.R., 54 F.3d 648, 650 (10th Cir. 1995) (“Questions of law are subject to a de novo standard of 
review.”); Bonin v. Vannaman, 929 P.2d 754, 775 (Kan. 1996) (“This court may review questions 
of law with an unlimited de novo standard of review.”); In re Marriage of Vandenberg, 229 P.3d 
1187, 1195 (Kan. Ct. App. 2010) (“to the extent the parties’ arguments require statutory 
interpretation, this court exercises unlimited review over such questions of law.”); Randall H. 
Warner, All Mixed Up About Mixed Questions, 7 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 101, 113 (2005) 
(“Questions of law are always for judges to decide and always reviewed de novo on appeal.”). 
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that burdensome process is completed, United States Supreme Court justices 
are the final word on the United States Constitution, and state supreme court 
justices are the final word on their state constitutions.63  In short, all appellate 
judges are, as one of them puts it, “occasional legislators”64 and justices on our 
federal and state supreme courts are tremendously important and powerful 
lawmakers. 
C. The Missouri Plan’s Discomfort with Legal Realism 
As just explained, all appellate judges are “occasional legislators” and 
justices on our federal and state supreme courts are tremendously important 
and powerful lawmakers.  Accordingly, the democratic imperative to select 
lawmakers in a manner that respects the basic equality among citizens—the 
principle of one-person, one-vote—is especially strong with respect to the 
judges with the greatest lawmaking role, that is appellate judges, especially 
supreme court justices.  Conversely, the Missouri Plan’s discrimination against 
non-lawyers—its greater weighting of a lawyer’s vote than another citizen’s 
vote65—makes it an especially inappropriate way to select such judges.66 
 
63. See, e.g., Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 784 (2002) (Scalia, J.) 
(“Not only do state-court judges possess the power to ‘make’ common law, but they have the 
immense power to shape the States’ constitutions as well. Which is precisely why the election of 
state judges became popular.” (internal citation omitted)). 
64. POSNER, supra note 9, at 81. 
65. See supra note 2 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 68-71 and accompanying 
text. 
66. See Paul D. Carrington & Adam R. Long, The Independence and Democratic 
Accountability of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 30 CAP. U. L. REV. 455 (2002). 
[The Missouri Plan] was popular in numerous states in the twentieth century, but in its 
application to courts of last resort it is linked to a vision of judicial office that is 
technocratic and apolitical. Although there was a time in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries when many American lawyers and some citizens deluded 
themselves with the belief that judges could be trained to be professional technicians 
interpreting statutes and constitutions without regard to their political consequences, 
there is virtually no one who thinks that today. 
 
As applied to highest state courts making decisions laden with political consequences, 
merit selection [the Missouri Plan] is therefore an increasingly difficult idea to sell, 
especially in an era in which the Supreme Court of the United States has undertaken so 
visibly to exercise such enormous political power and discretion with inconsistent 
regard for legal texts. The citizenry is quick to see that political power would be 
transferred from themselves to those who do the merit selecting. Despite the 
considerable advantages of merit selection for selecting professional technicians who 
sit on lower courts, its time as a politically viable alternative to judicial elections has 
passed. 
Id. at 469-70 (internal citations omitted).  See also Michael R. Dimino, Sr., Accountability Before 
the Fact, 22 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 451, 451-52 (2008) (“Public involvement 
in the staffing of high courts is beneficial from a democratic perspective because of the greater 
discretion and policy-making authority exercised by high courts. Lower courts, by contrast, are 
more often bound by settled law, and the judges on such courts do not make policy to the extent 
that other courts do. As a result, there is less need for public involvement in the selection of 
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The victims of this discrimination, however, may not be troubled by the 
inappropriateness of the Missouri Plan for selecting lawmakers because they 
may not realize that it is being used to select lawmakers.67  While most people 
likely would object to a lawyer’s vote counting more heavily than a non-
lawyer’s vote in the selection of governors and legislatures, that is because 
most people know that governors and legislators are lawmakers.  In contrast, 
many non-lawyers may not know that judges are lawmakers.  Many non-
lawyers may believe the myth that judges apply law made by others but do not, 
or at least should not, make law themselves.  These non-lawyers may, 
therefore, believe that judges should be selected entirely on their professional 
competence and ethics and that assessments of these factors are best left to 
lawyers. 
Thus lawyers defending the power advantage the Missouri Plan gives 
them over other citizens benefit from minimizing public awareness of the fact 
that judges inevitably make law.  Regrettably, lawyers defending the Missouri 
Plan sometimes make their defense with published statements describing the 
judicial role in a way that omits the lawmaking part of that role.  The following 
pages provide examples of such statements from the state whose version of the 
Missouri Plan goes farther than any other state supreme court selection process 
in discriminating against non-lawyers. 
III. OMISSIONS OF JUDICIAL LAWMAKING IN KANSAS 
Kansas gives the members of its bar more power than their fellow citizens 
in selecting the state’s two appellate courts.68  As in a handful of other states,69 
 
lower-court judges, and such involvement may well be a negative influence if it encourages those 
judges to depart from the application of settled law.”); Ware, supra note 2, at 768 (“the 
political/lawmaking side of judging is especially important for state supreme court justices 
because they are the final word on their state constitutions and common law. Accordingly, the 
case for democracy in judicial selection is at its strongest (and the case for elitism at its weakest) 
when the judges in question are supreme court justices because justices’ lawmaking powers far 
exceed those of the ‘professional technicians who sit on lower courts.’”). 
67. Of course, non-lawyers may not even realize that the Missouri Plan discriminates 
against them, let alone that it discriminates against them in the selection of lawmakers.  The 
discrimination of the Missouri Plan is concealed by those who describe the nominating 
commission as a body of “lawyers and non-lawyers,” while omitting explanation of who selects 
these lawyers and non-lawyers. 
68. KAN. CONST. art. 3, § 5(E); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 20-119 to 25 (2006).  For an overview 
of these provisions, see Stephen J. Ware, Selection to the Kansas Supreme Court, 17 KAN. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 386 (2008). 
The Supreme Court Nominating Commission is at the center of judicial selection in 
Kansas.  When there is a vacancy on the Kansas Supreme Court, the Nominating 
Commission assesses applicants and submits its three favorites to the Governor. The 
Governor must pick one of the three nominees and that person is thereby appointed a 
justice on the Kansas Supreme Court, without any further checks on the power of the 
Commission. Therefore, the Commission is the gatekeeper to the Kansas Supreme 
Court. The bar (lawyers licensed to practice in the state) has majority control over this 
gatekeeper. The Commission consists of nine members, five selected by the bar and 
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appellate judges in Kansas are selected in a Missouri Plan process that centers 
on a nominating commission some of whose members are picked in elections 
open only to lawyers.70  This discrimination against non-lawyers—taken 
farther in Kansas than in any other state71—is often defended on the ground 
that appellate judging has no political/lawmaking dimension, but rather is a 
purely professional/technical activity.  Therefore, (this faulty argument 
continues,) assessment of potential appellate judges ought to focus only on 
their professional competence and ethics, while disregarding their political 
views.  In short, defenders of Kansas’s current appellate court selection process 
often build their case on a foundation that crumbled about a century ago: the 
myth that judges do not make law. 
For example, former Kansas Bar Association President, Linda Parks, 
describes the Kansas Supreme Court Nominating Commission, not as a body 
that selects lawmakers, but rather as a body “that discusses lawyers and their 
qualifications for a job about which lawyers know the most.”72  Ms. Parks goes 
so far as to analogize the role of Kansas lawyers in selecting appellate judges 
to the role of medical doctors in referring patients to other, more specialized, 
 
four selected by the Governor. 
Id. at 386-87 nn.1-4 (emphasis added). 
69. While individual state variations can make categorizing difficult, about forty states’ 
highest courts are selected in broadly democratic ways: in contestable elections or through 
appointment largely controlled by democratically elected officials, typically the governor and 
legislature.  See Ware, supra note 2, at 752-64; Brian Fitzpatrick & Stephen Ware, How does 
your state select its judges?, INSIDE ALEC (American Legislative Exchange Council, D.C.), 
March 2011, at 9.  Other than Kansas, only eight states’ highest courts are selected in a process 
that substantially departs from democratic principles to give a member of the bar significantly 
greater power than one of his or her fellow citizens.  See ALASKA CONST. art. IV, §§ 5, 8 
(nominating commission consists of seven members: chief justice, three lawyers appointed by 
governing body of the organized bar, three non-lawyers appointed by governor subject to 
confirmation by legislature); IND. CONST. of 1851, art. VII, §§ 9-10 (1970); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 
33-27-2-2, -2-1 (LexisNexis 2007) (seven members: chief justice, three lawyers elected by 
members of bar, three non-lawyers appointed by governor); IOWA CONST. of 1857, art. V, § 16 
(1962); IOWA CODE §§ 46.1-.2, .15 (2006) (fifteen members: chief justice, seven lawyers elected 
by members of bar, seven non-lawyers appointed by governor and confirmed by senate); MO. 
CONST. of 1945, art. V, § 25(a)–(d) (1976); MO. SUP. CT. R. 10.03 (seven members: one supreme 
court judge chosen by members of court, three lawyers elected by members of bar, three non-
lawyers appointed by governor); NEB. CONST. of 1875, art. V, § 21 (1972); NEB. REV. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 24-801to 24-812 (LexisNexis 2007) (nine members: chief judge, four lawyers elected by 
members of bar, four non-lawyers appointed by governor); OKLA. CONST. art. VII-B, § 3 (fifteen 
members: six lawyers elected by members of bar, six non-lawyers appointed by governor and 
three non-lawyers selected by elected officials and/or other members); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 
16-1A-2 (2007) (seven members: three lawyers appointed by president of bar, two circuit judges 
elected by judicial conference, and two non-lawyers appointed by governor); WYO. CONST. art. 
V, § 4; WYO. STAT. ANN. § 5-1-102 (2007) (seven members: chief justice, three lawyers elected 
by members of bar, three non-lawyers appointed by governor). 
70. See sources cited supra note 69. 
71. Stephen J. Ware, The Bar’s Extraordinarily Powerful Role in Selecting the Kansas 
Supreme Court, 18 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 392, 406-09 (2009). 
72. Linda S. Parks, No Reform is Needed, 77 J. KAN. B.A. 4 (Feb. 2008). 
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physicians.  Parks says: “If you have a serious medical condition, you don’t 
turn to a neighbor or a politician to find a specialist.”73  Similarly, why would 
you want appellate judges to be selected by your neighbors (in democratic 
elections74) or by politicians (in a form of indirect, representative 
democracy75)?  Democracy, Parks implies, is no more appropriate in selecting 
appellate judges than in selecting medical specialists. 
The major flaw in this analogy between appellate judges and physicians, 
of course, is that appellate judging is not just about professional expertise and 
ethics.  It is also about lawmaking.  As the first section of this article 
explained, we have known at least since the Legal Realists of the early 20th 
Century that judges not only apply law made by others, but also inevitably 
engage in lawmaking themselves.  The job of an appellate judge, unlike the job 
of a medical doctor, involves making law.  It is fine for doctors, plumbers, 
hairdressers, and countless other occupations to be selected entirely on the 
basis of technical expertise, without any role for democracy.  But in a society 
like ours, lawmakers should be selected democratically simply because the 
People are sovereign.76 
 
73. Id. 
74. Nearly half the states use contestable elections to select their highest courts.  Ware, 
supra note 68, at 389 n.13.  In some states, interim vacancies (that occur during a justice’s 
uncompleted term) are filled in a different manner from initial vacancies.  See AM. JUDICATURE 
SOC’Y, METHODS OF JUDICIAL SECTION, http://www.judicialselection.us/judicial_selection/ 
methods/selection_of_judges.cfm (last visited Jan. 25, 2013).  Several states that use elections to 
fill initial vacancies use nominating commissions to fill interim vacancies.  Id. 
75. Senate confirmation of the executive’s nominee has, for over two centuries, been the 
method by which federal judges are selected.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.  Similarly, in a dozen 
states the governor nominates state supreme court justices, but the governor’s nominee does not 
join the court unless confirmed by the state senate or similar popularly elected body.  Ware, supra 
note 68, at 388-89 nn.11-12.  Confirmation is done by the state senate in Delaware, Hawaii, 
Maine, Maryland, New Jersey, New York, Utah and Vermont; by the entire legislature in 
Connecticut and Rhode Island; and by the governor’s council in Massachusetts and New 
Hampshire.  A thirteenth state, California, can be added.  Its confirmation body is a three-person 
commission made up of the chief justice, attorney general and most senior presiding justice of the 
court of appeals in California.  Id. 
76. When the lawmakers in question are judges, I prefer the indirect democracy of a senate 
confirmation appointment process to the direct democracy of contestable elections.  Stephen J. 
Ware, The Missouri Plan in National Perspective, 74 MO. L. REV. 751, 772-74 (2009).  See also 
Richard A. Posner, Judicial Autonomy in a Political Environment, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 3-5 (2006) 
(endorsing Joseph Schumpeter as “[t]he best theorist of our actual existing democratic system”). 
The election of judges violates Schumpeter's conception of democratic rule. In that 
conception, the people vote only on the top officials, the ones who make the really 
consequential decisions, so that the people have some sense of whether those are the 
officials they want ruling them. The people are not busy monitoring the activities of the 
civil servants. That is not their function. They are not to waste their time trying to 
master issues and to figure out whether the dog catcher is catching enough dogs. 
. . . . 
. . . [T]he election of judges even at the state or local level is contrary to the core of 
Schumpeter's insight, which is that we do not want our citizens to spend their time 
trying to master technical issues of governance. That is not an efficient division of 
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The power of this point against judicial selection processes that violate a 
democratic society’s basic equality among citizens—the principle of one-
person, one-vote—may be lost on those who do not realize that judicial 
selection is lawmaker selection.  So members of the Kansas bar defending their 
power advantage (over other Kansas citizens) in judicial selection benefit from 
minimizing public awareness of the fact that judges inevitably make law. 
Ms. Parks is not the only lawyer defending the current Kansas appellate 
court selection process by publishing statements describing the appellate 
judge’s role in a way that omits the lawmaking part of this role.  Such 
statements have also been made by Kansas judges, sitting and retired.77  For 
example, the late Richard Greene, then chief judge of the Kansas Court of 
Appeals, testified before the Kansas Legislature against a bill that would have 
reduced the extent to which the state discriminates against non-lawyers in 
judicial selection.78 
In opposition to that bill, Judge Greene also published a newspaper op-ed 
praising the current Kansas appellate court selection process, which he 
described as a process designed “to ensure that only the best and brightest were 
selected to the Court of Appeals.”79 
“Kansas enjoys one of the best intermediate appellate courts in the 
nation,” Judge Greene wrote.80  The high quality of the Kansas Court of 
Appeals, Judge Greene said, is due to the nominating commission’s focus on 
prospective judges’ “merit,” rather than their politics.  In fact, Judge Greene 
asserted that judges’ politics are “of no relevance.”81  He said Kansans need 
“judges whose sole allegiance is to the applicable law of our state, as well as 
 
labor. Most of what courts do is opaque to people who are not lawyers. It is completely 
unrealistic to think that the average voter will ever know enough about judicial 
performance to be able to evaluate judicial candidates intelligently. 
Id. 
77. See infra notes 85-86 and accompanying text. 
78. The bill, HB 2101, would have eliminated such discrimination with respect to the 
Kansas Court of Appeals but left it in place with respect to the Kansas Supreme Court, available 
at http://www.kslegislature.org/li_2012/b2011_12/measures/hb2101/. 
79. Judge Richard D. Greene, Don’t politicize judicial appointment system, THE WICHITA 
EAGLE (Feb. 24, 2011), available at http://www.kansas.com/2011/02/24/1733731/dont-politicize-
judicial-appointment.html#ixzz1ZCLAP7wA. 
80. Id. 
81. Court of appeals judges appointed by the governor, confirmed by the Senate; 
eliminating the nominating commission for the court of appeals: Hearing on HB 2101 Before H. 
Comm. on Judiciary, 2011 Leg. (Ks. 2011) (written testimony of Chief Judge Richard D. Greene, 
at ¶ 11) (“Judges should be chosen based on the criteria set forth in K.S.A. 20-3004 to bring 
intelligent, experienced, well-reasoned, and impartial justice to every case before them.  Their 
politics-their allegiance to a Governor or to the Senate-are not only of no relevance, but should 
never take the front seat to merit based qualifications.”).  The false dichotomy between “politics” 
and “merit” in judicial selection is discussed infra Section IV. 
 http://www.kansas.com/2011/02/24/1733731/dont-politicize-judicial-
appointment.html#ixzz1ZCLAP7wA. 
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our state and federal constitutions.”82 
Yes, of course judges’ allegiance should be to the law, including our state 
and federal constitutions.  But that allegiance does not ineluctably guide the 
judge to make a particular choice among various reasonable interpretations of a 
vague or ambiguous constitutional or statutory provision.  Reasonable people 
of good faith, including judges, can disagree about the best interpretation of 
such provisions and therefore the best result of the particular case.  Claims to 
the contrary do not acknowledge the reality that the first section of this article 
showed has been “deeply rooted” for generations now—that judicial 
interpretation of constitutional and statutory ambiguities necessarily involves 
judgments of policy by the court.83 
And what of the common law, which went unmentioned in Judge 
Greene’s anti-realist argument that judges’ politics are “of no relevance”?84  
He said “[w]e need . . . judges who will fairly and impartially interpret and 
apply Kansas law without regard to political ideology.”85  But this description 
of the judicial role does not account for the fact that judges make the common 
law, not just “interpret and apply” it.  In sum, it is unfortunate that the chief 
judge of one of Kansas’s two appellate courts publicly described the role of an 
appellate judge in a way that omitted the lawmaking part of that role. 
Other defenders of the current Kansas appellate court selection system 
similarly ignore about a century of legal realism to assert the irrelevance of 
judges’ political views86 and the absence of judicial lawmaking.87  A 
particularly striking example of anti-realism, by Kansas District Court Judge 
Janice D. Russell, says that judges research to “reveal what the law is” and 
then simply “must follow the rule of law in deciding cases.”88  According to 
Judge Russell: 
courts are fair and impartial only when they unflinchingly apply the 
 
82. Greene, supra note 79. 
83. See supra Section I. 
84. See sources cited supra note 81. 
85.  Greene, supra note 79. 
86. Retired Kansas Supreme Court Justice Fred Six says of his colleagues on both of the 
Kansas appellate courts:  “We served on the Court as judges, not as Republicans or Democrats.”  
Court of appeals judges appointed by the governor, confirmed by the Senate; eliminating the 
nominating commission for the court of appeals: Hearing on HB 2101 Before H. Comm. on 
Judiciary, 2011 Leg. (Ks. Feb. 16, 2011) (written testimony of Justice Fred N. Six (ret.), at 4). 
See also Court of appeals judges appointed by the governor, confirmed by the Senate; eliminating 
the nominating commission for the court of appeals: Hearing on HB 2101before H. Comm. on 
Judiciary, 2005 Leg. (Ks. Feb. 21, 2005) (written testimony of Justice Fred N. Six (ret.), at 6-3) 
(substantially the same testimony). 
87. Court of appeals judges appointed by the governor, confirmed by the Senate; 
eliminating the nominating commission for the court of appeals: Hearing on HB 2101 Before H. 
Comm. on Judiciary, 2011 Leg. (Ks. Feb. 16, 2011) (written testimony of Eugene Balloun, 
Kansas Association of Defense Counsel, at 2) (we want judges to “make principled decisions 
based only on the law and the facts of the case”). 
88. Janice D. Russell, The Merits of Merit Selection, 17 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 437, 441 
(2008). 
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rule of law to their cases. Application of the rule of law requires 
knowledge of the law; this requires the willingness and ability to 
research caselaw and statutes, which reveal what the law is. These 
abilities are essential for every level of the legal system from the 
lawyers to the judges. Lawyers therefore are in a better position than 
any other group of people to determine which applicants possess the 
proper combination of professional knowledge, skill, integrity, and 
work ethic to carry out the duties of a judge. 
 Judges from municipal courts right up through the Supreme Court 
must follow the rule of law in deciding cases.89 
In what sense “must” the Supreme Court do anything in deciding cases?  As 
noted above, unless and until the burdensome process of constitutional 
amendment is completed, U.S. Supreme Court justices are the final word on 
the U.S. Constitution and state supreme court justices are the final word on 
their state constitutions.90  And, of course, this includes the power to hold 
unconstitutional laws enacted by the other two branches of government.  These 
basic realities are notably absent from Judge Russell’s description of the 
judicial role.  Also absent are the more mundane realities of judges inevitably 
making law in their choices among various reasonable interpretations of vague 
or ambiguous statutory provisions and their choices among various possible 
common law rules.91 
Examples of these mundane realities follow.  These examples get beyond 
headline-grabbing cases and the oft-studied Supreme Court of the United 
States to identify and analyze the judicial lawmaking embedded in the routine 
work of state’s court system, the sort of judicial work that weaves most of the 
threads in the fabric of law. 
IV. EXAMPLES OF JUDICIAL LAWMAKING IN KANSAS 
A. Kansas Supreme Court 
This section consists of examples of lawmaking by Kansas judges.  The 
first subsection consists of several examples from the Kansas Supreme Court 
and the second subsection consists of several examples from the Kansas Court 
of Appeals. 
1. Workers’ Compensation 
A crystal clear case of lawmaking by the Kansas Supreme Court is a 
workers’ compensation case, Coleman v. Armour Swift-Eckrich.92  As the 
court’s opinion by Justice Beier explained, 
The pertinent facts are simple and undisputed. While waiting for the 
start of a meeting required by her employer, Armour Swift-Eckrich, 
 
89. Id. 
90. See supra note 63 and accompanying text. 
91. See supra Section I. 
92. 130 P.3d 111 (Kan. 2006). 
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Coleman sat on a chair with rollers, with her feet propped up on 
another chair. A coworker came up behind Coleman, took hold of the 
back of her chair, and dumped her out of it and onto the floor. The 
fall injured her back. There was no ill will between Coleman and her 
coworker, nor had Coleman done anything to provoke or encourage 
him. There was no evidence that such horseplay was common at 
Armour Swift-Eckrich or that the company had in some way 
condoned the coworker’s actions.93 
Was Coleman entitled to workers’ compensation?  Not under Kansas law as it 
stood at the time of this 2006 case.  As Justice Beier’s opinion for the court 
candidly acknowledged, “Armour Swift-Eckrich is correct that our precedent 
dealing with situations similar to Coleman’s is clear and, if adhered to, would 
deny her relief.”94 
So Coleman would clearly lose this case if, as the above quote from 
Kansas Judge Russell argues, judges merely research to “reveal what the law 
is” and then simply “must follow the rule of law in deciding cases.”95  Under 
this unrealistically narrow description of judging, the Coleman case would end 
in a simple ruling for the defendant.  If judges do not engage in lawmaking—as 
Judge Russell, Judge Greene and the other Kansas lawyers quoted in section II 
argue—then Coleman would clearly lose this case.  As Justice Beier said, “The 
rule is clear, . . .: An injury from horseplay does not arise out of employment 
and is not compensable unless the employer was aware of the activity or it had 
become a habit at the workplace.”96  A clear rule like this—according to Judge 
Greene’s narrow description of the judicial role quoted above—compels a 
court to “apply [that] rule without regard to political ideology.”97 
But this is not, in fact, what Justice Beier and her colleagues on the 
Kansas Supreme Court did.  Rather they did what Kansas Judges Greene and 
Russell say never happens.  Justice Beier and her colleagues engaged in 
lawmaking.  They changed the legal rule from one contrary to their ideologies 
to one consistent with their ideologies. 
Justice Beier’s opinion started by criticizing the old rule, while 
acknowledging that it was, in fact, the rule prior to her opinion by which the 
Supreme Court made new law.  Here again is the above quote from Coleman, 
but now with the formerly omitted words restored and italicized: “The rule is 
clear, if a bit decrepit and unpopular: An injury from horseplay does not arise 
out of employment and is not compensable unless the employer was aware of 
the activity or it had become a habit at the workplace.”98 
Who decided that this rule is “decrepit and unpopular” and so should be 
changed?  Was it the Kansas Legislature?  No, it was the Kansas Supreme 
 
93. Id. at 112. 
94. Id. at 114. 
95. Russell, supra note 88. 
96. Coleman, 130 P.3d at 114. 
97. See Greene, supra note 79. 
98. Coleman, 130 P.3d at 114. 
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Court.  It was judges, not legislators, who decided that this legal rule was bad 
policy.  It was judges, not legislators, who changed the law to bring it in line 
with what the lawmaking judges thought was good policy.  As Justice Beier 
candidly stated: 
Coleman cannot prevail on this appeal unless we are willing to do 
now what this court was unwilling to do . . . in 1946: Reevaluate the 
wisdom of the horseplay rule. Sixty years later, we think it is time to 
do so. 
Coleman is correct that the climate has changed since [an earlier 
case] was decided. The Kansas rule, once in the clear majority 
[around the country], is now an anachronism. 
Courts of last resort, such as this one, are not inexorably bound by 
their own precedents. They follow the rule of law established in 
earlier cases unless clearly convinced that the rule was originally 
erroneous or is no longer sound. State v. Marsh, 278 Kan. 520, Syl. ¶ 
23, 102 P.3d 445 (2004). We are clearly convinced here that our old 
rule should be abandoned. Although appropriate for the time in 
which it arose, we are persuaded by the overwhelming weight of 
contrary authority in our sister states and current legal 
commentary.99 
Contrary to Judge Russell’s anti-realist statement quoted above, Justice Beier 
acknowledges that nothing tells “courts of last resort”100 what they “must”101 
do in deciding cases.  Rather than being compelled to “follow the rule of law,” 
as Judge Russell claims, Justice Beier rightly says the Kansas Supreme Court 
may change the state’s common law if the judges on this court believe some 
aspect of that law “is no longer sound.”102  Those sitting on the Kansas 
Supreme Court, like judges sitting on other states’ high courts, make common 
law based on what they are “persuaded” is “appropriate for the time.”103 
Those are the words of a unanimous opinion of the Kansas Supreme 
Court and they are not earth-shattering.  They are merely describing something 
virtually every lawyer has seen since the first year of law school.  State 
supreme courts make common law based on what they are persuaded is 
appropriate for the time.  Changing the law is what state supreme courts do 
with common law rules they believe to be “decrepit and unpopular.”  They 
overturn the decrepit and unpopular old law and make new law, which they 
believe will be more in keeping with contemporary society.  This lawmaking 
by state supreme courts is not always done as openly as it was by the Kansas 
Supreme Court in Coleman, but it is done from time to time.  It is part of the 
job.  We have known this at least since the legal realists of the early 20th 
Century. 
 
99. Id. at 115-16 (emphasis added). 
100. Id. at 116. 
101. Russell, supra note 88. 
102. Coleman, 130 P.3d at 116. 
103. Id. at 116. 
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2. Product Liability 
The Coleman opinion may be one of the clearest examples of Kansas 
judges making common law because of the duality of the court’s choice: 
whether to keep or reject an existing rule.  In contrast, legal rules are not 
always so “black or white,” but often more like “shades of gray.”  That is, 
courts sometimes make law, not by changing a legal rule to its polar opposite 
in a single case, but rather by changing it gradually over several cases, spread 
over many years.104  Product liability law is an example of this incremental 
judicial lawmaking in Kansas, as it is in other states. 
Must a product liability plaintiff prove the defendant’s negligence in order 
to recover? No, the Kansas Supreme Court held in Brooks v. Dietz,105 which 
brought strict products liability into Kansas law.  The Brooks court deemed 
“correct” the assertion that it had “never explicitly adopted the doctrine of 
strict liability,”106 but pointed out that it had “for years recognized something 
closely akin to strict liability in the food and body preparation cases.”107  
Continuing this history, the Brooks court said: “In recent years we have gone 
beyond the ‘food and body preparation’ cases and have held manufacturers and 
sellers strictly liable for other dangerously defective products.”108  Brooks then 
endorsed what it rightly called the “seminal” case of Greenman v. Yuba Power 
Products, Inc.109  This California case, according to the Kansas Supreme 
Court, “recognized that liability for damages resulting from putting in 
commerce a dangerously defective product is not the result of contract but, like 
other tort liability, is imposed by public policy.”110 
Yes, “public policy,” indeed.  Public policy as determined by a California 
court, which, along with other factors, persuaded courts elsewhere in the 
country, including the Kansas Supreme Court, to change their states’ laws to 
adopt this policy as well.  In Brooks, the Kansas Supreme Court recounts the 
history of Kansas product liability law changing, incrementally, through a 
series of judicial decisions.  It is a very typical story of how judges make the 
common law.  And it is a story, told by the highest judges in Kansas, of how 
their court made an important part of the common law of Kansas. 
Adopting strict liability was not the end of the Kansas Supreme Court’s 
lawmaking role in product cases.  I will not mention all the twists and turns but 
note only two.  First, in a case alleging defective design of a product, can a 
 
104. See Widiss, supra note 42 (“notwithstanding respect for precedent, common law courts 
reconsider prior precedents in response to changing needs or evolving norms; often, this occurs 
gradually as prior decisions are distinguished and new decisions slowly accumulate until 
ultimately a high court announces a new rule”). 
105. 545 P.2d 1104 (Kan. 1976) (“We have concluded the time has come for this court to 
adopt the rule of strict liability . . . .”). 
106. Id. at 1107. 
107. Id. 
108. Id. 
109. 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963). 
110. Brooks, 545 P.2d at 1107. 
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manufacturer be liable for a danger that is “open or obvious”?  Yes, according 
to the Kansas Supreme Court decision in Siruta v. Hesston Corp.111  This 
ruling was reaffirmed 17 years later in Delaney v. Deere and Co.,112 which 
acknowledged  that “the open and obvious rule barring recovery in a design 
defect case” was “still recognized in a few jurisdictions.”113  In other words, 
Siruta’s rejection of the “open and obvious” rule barring recovery was a 
lawmaking choice by the Kansas Supreme Court.  It had the option to retain 
that legal rule—as some other states’ courts had done—but it chose to reject 
that rule. 
The Delaney court continued the Kansas Supreme Court’s role in making 
product liability law as Delaney held that in a design-defect case the plaintiff is 
not required to show evidence of a reasonable alternative design.  The court 
chose this rule, while acknowledging that a few states chose the opposite 
rule.114  In choosing how to make Kansas law on this subject, the court relied 
in part on a law review article in which the author “states that the reasonable 
alternative design requirement is not supported by public policy or economic 
analysis.”115 
In short, Delaney is yet another example of judges making law based on 
what they think is good policy.  Delaney and these other product liability cases 
are examples of high court judges making law based on what they are 
persuaded is, as Justice Beier put it, “appropriate for the time.”116  Although 
these product cases may have been more gradual than Coleman, (the workers 
compensation case), they are similarly solid examples of the Kansas Supreme 
Court making law, not just applying or interpreting it.  Thus they stand in 
refutation of descriptions (quoted in section II) of a judge’s role that omit the 
lawmaking part of that role. 
A few more brief examples of lawmaking by the Kansas Supreme Court 
follow. 
3. Parolees 
Does the state have a legal duty to control the conduct of parolees to 
prevent harm to other persons or property?  When the Kansas Supreme Court 
confronted this question in Schmidt v. HTG, Inc., it noted a split of authority in 
other states.117  For example, a Washington court held that, yes, “a parole 
officer takes charge of the parolees he or she supervises despite the lack of a 
custodial or continuous relationship” and this had the effect of imposing 
 
111. 659 P.2d 799, 806 (Kan. 1983). 
112. 999 P.2d 930 (Kan. 2000). 
113. Id. at 939. 
114. Id. at 946 (citing John F. Vargo, The Emperor’s New Clothes: The American Law 
Institute Adorns a “New Cloth” for Section 402A Products Liability Design Defects-A Survey of 
the States Reveals a Different Weave, 26 U. MEM. L. REV. 493 (1996)). 
115. Id. at 946. 
116. See supra note 99 and accompanying text. 
117. 961 P.2d 677 (Kan. 1998). 
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liability on the state.118  However, the Kansas Supreme Court “reject[ed]” this 
rule and said “The better-reasoned and more logical approach is that taken in [a 
Virginia case] which held that state parole officers did not take charge”119 of a 
parolee in the relevant sense. 
So Kansas law on this topic (as in the workers compensation and product 
liability examples above) was made, not by the legislative or executive 
branches, but by the judges on the Kansas Supreme Court.  In Schmidt, as in 
the workers compensation and product liability cases above, the lawmaking 
judges did not pretend that they were compelled by the legislature or anyone 
else to choose one possible legal rule over another possible legal rule.  Instead, 
the judges decided which view was “better-reasoned” and then made that view 
the law. 
4. Malpractice Actions Against Criminal-Defense Attorneys 
May a convicted criminal defendant pursue a legal malpractice action 
against his criminal-defense attorney without first obtaining any post-
conviction relief?  No, he may not, the Kansas Supreme Court held in Canaan 
v. Bartee,120 adopting what is known as the “exoneration rule.”121  In so 
holding, the Kansas Supreme Court acknowledged that it was making law.  
The Canaan court said that “Whether a plaintiff must be exonerated in post-
conviction proceedings before bringing a legal malpractice action against his 
criminal defense attorney is an issue of first impression in Kansas.”122  The 
court discussed earlier Kansas cases and concluded that they did not resolve 
the issue: “Thus, we are left to decide whether we will apply the exoneration 
rule in legal malpractice actions in Kansas.”123 
The Canaan court reviewed decisions from courts around the country and 
noted that most adopted the exoneration rule but some did not.  The court also 
summarized what it candidly called “Policy Reasons Behind the Exoneration 
Rule.”124  The Canaan court’s punch line was: “After consideration of these 
authorities, the varying policy justifications, and the shortcomings of the 
various approaches, we find the majority view persuasive. We hold that before 
Canaan may sue his attorneys for legal malpractice he must obtain post-
conviction relief.”125 
Who considered “varying policy justifications” in deciding what Kansas 
law should be?  Was it the Kansas Legislature?  No, it was the judges on the 
Kansas Supreme Court.  As in all the examples discussed above, when it 
 
118. Id. at 686-87. 
119. Id. 
120. 72 P.3d 911, 914-21 (Kan. 2003). 
121. See generally Amy L. Leisinger, A Criminal Defendant’s Inability to Sue His Lawyer 
for Malpractice: The Other Side of the Exoneration Rule, (Canaan v. Bartee, 72 P.3d 911 (Kan. 
2003)), 44 WASHBURN L.J. 693, at 694, 712 (2005). 
122. Canaan, 72 P.3d at 914. 
123. Id. at 915. 
124. Id. at 916. 
125. Id. at 921. 
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comes to the exoneration rule, Kansas law is what it is because high court 
judges chose for that to be law based on what they considered “persuasive.” 
5. Negligence Per Se 
An important tort law doctrine is negligence per se.  As the Kansas Court 
of Appeals said in Shirley v. Glass,126 
the doctrine of negligence per se in Kansas differs from the 
negligence per se recognized in other states. 
. . . . 
In Kansas, the doctrine of negligence per se . . . recognizes the 
creation of an individual cause of action from a criminal statute or 
administrative regulation. An individual cause of action does not 
arise from every statute or regulation, but only from those which 
were enacted or promulgated with legislative intent to create an 
individual cause of action as opposed to a statute or regulation 
intended merely to protect the safety or welfare of the public at large. 
In every other state, the doctrine refers to the judicial process in 
negligence actions of taking a specific standard of care from a 
criminal statute or ordinance or from an administrative regulation 
that is in fact silent about issues of civil liability.127 
Who were the Kansas lawmakers who made this aspect of Kansas law different 
from the law of other states?  The judges on the two Kansas appellate courts.128  
That this lawmaking is done by the Kansas Supreme Court was recognized by 
Kansas Court of Appeals Judge Malone who acknowledged that “in order to 
recover under negligence per se in Kansas, the plaintiff must establish that the 
legislature intended to create an individual right of action arising from the 
violation of a statute.”129  But Judge Malone went on to criticize this law and 
asked the Kansas Supreme Court to change it: 
There is no rational basis for requiring a party to establish that the 
legislature intended to create an individual right of action to recover 
under negligence per se. The Kansas Supreme Court should 
reevaluate this requirement. At the very least, the court should 
reevaluate the two-part test used in Kansas in determining whether a 
private right of action is created.130 
Why did Judge Malone ask the Kansas Supreme Court, rather than the Kansas 
Legislature, to change this law?  Because Judge Malone knows that the 
legislature is not the only lawmaker.  Judge Malone knows that judges make 
law too, and that a state supreme court is an especially powerful lawmaker.  In 
short, Judge Malone acknowledged legal realism.  Unlike the Kansas judges 
 
126. 241 P.3d 134, 150-51 (Kan. Ct. App. 2010) (describing the elements and development 
of negligence per se in Kansas tort law). 
127. Id. (quoting William E. Westerbeke & Stephen R. McAllister, Survey of Kansas Tort 
Law: Part I, 49 U. KAN. L. REV. 1037, 1053 (2001)). 
128. Such as the judges who decided Pullen v. West, 92 P.3d 584 (Kan. 2004), and Estate of 
Pemberton v. John’s Sports Ctr., Inc., 135 P.3d 174 (Kan. Ct. App. 2006). 
129. Shirley, 241 P.3d at 158 (Malone, J., concurring). 
130. Id. at 161. 
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quoted in section II of this article, Judge Malone did not make the anti-realist 
claims that judges just “interpret and apply”131 law made by others or that 
judges research to “reveal what the law is” and then simply “must follow the 
rule of law in deciding cases.”132  Judge Malone acknowledged that the Kansas 
Supreme Court makes the law on negligence per se.  The Kansas Supreme 
Court does not merely “follow” the law or “interpret” the law or “apply” the 
law; it “makes” the law. 
In fact, Judge Malone explained that the Kansas Supreme Court had 
already made the law on negligence per se by choosing the legal rule Judge 
Malone prefers and then the Kansas Supreme Court changed the law on 
negligence per se by choosing the rule Judge Malone opposes.133  In a 1971 
case,134 the Kansas Supreme Court did not require a negligence-per-se plaintiff 
to establish that the legislature intended to create an individual right of action.  
But then in later cases, the Kansas Supreme Court imposed this requirement.135  
According to Judge Malone, the Kansas Supreme Court made the law on 
negligence per se.  Then the Kansas Supreme Court re-made the law on 
negligence per se.  And in the recent case of Shirley v. Glass, Judge Malone 
asks the Kansas Supreme Court to re-make the law on negligence per se again. 
6. Uniform Commercial Code 
All the above examples of lawmaking by the Kansas Supreme Court 
might be characterized as common law, rather than statutory law.  But the 
Kansas Supreme Court makes law in its interpretation of statutes as well.  An 
example of such a statute is the Kansas Uniform Commercial Code.  Several 
sections of this statute were interpreted by the Kansas Supreme Court in 
Wachter Management Co. v. Dexter & Chaney, Inc.,136 which involved the 
following facts: 
 A software company in the State of Washington (DCI) sought to 
sell software to a construction company in Kansas (Wachter). 
 “After detailed negotiations, DCI issued a written proposal to 
Wachter . . . for . . . installation of the software, a full year of 
maintenance, and a training and consulting package.” 
 “An agent for Wachter signed DCI’s proposal.” 
 DCI shipped the software and assisted Wachter in installing it on 
Wachter’s computer system. 
 Enclosed with the software, DCI included a software licensing 
agreement, also known as a “shrinkwrap” agreement, which 
provided (among other things) that any disputes would be 
resolved by courts in Washington. 
 
131. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
132. Russell, supra note 88. 
133. Shirley, 241 P.3d at 158-59 (Malone, J., concurring). 
134. Noland v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 483 P.2d 1029 (Kan. 1971). 
135. Shirley, 241 P.3d at 158-59 (Malone, J., concurring). 
136. 144 P.3d 747 (Kan. 2006). 
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The Kansas Supreme Court held that the parties’ contract did not require 
that disputes be resolved by Washington courts.  In reaching this conclusion, 
the court interpreted the Kansas Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) as 
providing that a contract was formed when Wachter’s agent signed DCI’s 
proposal,137 so the later delivery of the shrinkwrap agreement made the 
shrinkwrap agreement an offer to modify an existing contract.  That offer was 
never accepted by Wachter, the Kansas Supreme Court said, so the original 
contract (with no terms on where disputes would be resolved) continued to 
state the parties’ rights and duties.138 
In contrast, a dissenting opinion by Justice Luckert argued that the 
parties’ contract required that disputes be resolved by Washington courts 
because the UCC should be interpreted as providing that Wachter’s acceptance 
of DCI’s proposal included acceptance of the license.  Justice Luckert wrote: 
I disagree with the majority’s analysis that the license agreement was 
a modification of the contract. Rather, the original offer included the 
license or, at least, expressed the intent of the parties that a license 
was a part of the offer. Wachter assented to and accepted these terms 
by its conduct. 
DCI’s letter transmitting the proposal notified Wachter that “[t]he 
proposal includes modules and licenses.” Wachter did not question, 
object to, or offer an alternative to the proposal. Instead Wachter 
signed the proposal, thus accepting the offer which included 
licenses.139 
Importantly, Justice Luckert’s dissent cited and analyzed two sections of the 
Kansas UCC, § 2-204 and § 2-209,140 and these two sections were also among 
those cited and analyzed by the majority opinion.141  In short, both majority 
and dissent were interpreting the same statutory language, but they came to 
different conclusions about the law. 
This is not shocking.  As the first section of this article explained, the 
language of statutory and constitutional provisions is sometimes vague or 
 
137. Id. at 751. 
DCI’s proposal requested Wachter to accept its offer to sell Wachter software by 
signing the proposal above the words “[p]lease ship the software listed above.” 
Accordingly, Wachter accepted DCI’s offer to sell the software to it by signing the 
proposal at Wachter’s office in Lenexa. Thus, a contract was formed when Wachter 
accepted DCI’s offer to sell it the software, indicating agreement between the parties. 
Id. 
138. “Proposed amendments that materially alter the original agreement are not considered 
part of the contract unless both parties agree to the amendments.  UCC 2-209 requires express 
assent to the proposed modifications.”  Id. at 752 (citations omitted).  “DCI argues that Wachter 
expressly consented to the shrink wrap agreement when it installed and used the software rather 
than returning it. However, continuing with the contract after receiving a writing with additional 
or different terms is not sufficient to establish express consent to the additional or different 
terms.”  Id. 
139. Id. at 755 (Luckert, J., dissenting). 
140. Id. at 756. 
141. Id. at 755. 
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ambiguous.  Such provisions do not compel a single result in each case that 
might arise, as reasonable people can disagree about the best interpretation of 
the provisions and therefore the best result of the particular case.  “The legal 
realists saw the interpretation of statutory ambiguities as necessarily involving 
judgments of policy and principle.  They insisted that when courts understand 
statutes to mean one thing rather than another, they use judgments of their 
own, at least in genuinely hard cases.”142 
This case, Wachter, was a genuinely hard case.  Confirming this, both the 
majority and dissent were able to cite cases from other jurisdictions 
interpreting the same statutory language in other states’ versions of the 
UCC.143  Just as this statutory interpretation split the Kansas Supreme Court, it 
similarly split judges elsewhere in the country.  In some parts of the country 
the law is that a shrinkwrap license is part of the original contract and thus 
enforceable, while in other parts of the country the law is that a shrinkwrap 
license is not part of the original contract so it is only enforceable if the parties 
modify their original contract to include the license.144  The same statutory 
language around the country results in different law because different judges 
have made different law while interpreting the same statutory language. 
This is no more surprising than the aforementioned examples of judges 
making the common law.  Judges making law in interpreting statutes is also 
inevitable and routine.  It is simply part of what judges do. 
Interestingly, three members of the Kansas Supreme Court dissented from 
Wachter.  Justices Nuss and Beier joined Justice Luckert’s dissenting opinion.  
So it was a 4-3 decision.  Had one more member of the court been persuaded 
by the dissent’s interpretation of the UCC then that interpretation would have 
become Kansas law.  This shows the lawmaking power of each individual 
appellate judge.  Just as a single state legislator’s vote can mean the difference 
between a state’s law including one rule or another, so a single judge’s vote 
can mean the difference between a state’s law including one rule or another.145 
 
142. Sunstein, supra note 28, at 2591. 
143. The majority cited Step-Saver Data Systems, Inc. v. Wyse Technology, 939 F.2d 91, 98 
(3d Cir. 1991) (refusing to uphold a shrink wrap license agreement as an amendment to the 
parties’ contract); Arizona Retail Systems v. Software Link, 831 F. Supp. 759, 764 (D. Ariz. 1993) 
(concluding that a software company could not unilaterally change the terms of a preexisting 
contract by including a shrink wrap license agreement with the software when it shipped); Klocek 
v. Gateway, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1341-42 (D. Kan. 2000) (denying the application of an 
arbitration clause contained in a form with standard terms packaged inside a computer box); 
United States Surgical Corp. v. Orris, Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d 1201, 1206 (D. Kan. 1998) (rejecting 
“single use only” language on the packaging because there was no evidence that the parties 
agreed on this limitation in the contract), while the dissent cited Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 
F.3d 1147, 1149-50 (7th Cir.), cert. denied 522 U.S. 808, 118 S. Ct. 47, 139 L. Ed. 2d 13 (1997); 
ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d at 1452-53; Brower v. Gateway 2000, 246 A.D.2d 246, 250-
51, 676 N.Y.S.2d 569 (1998); and Mortenson Co. v. Timberline Software, 140 Wash.2d 568, 583-
84, 998 P.2d 305 (2000). 
144. Id. 
145. See State v. Marsh, 102 P.3d 445 (Kan. 2004). 
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B. Kansas Court of Appeals 
The cases just discussed show that the Kansas Supreme Court, like any 
other state’s high court, inevitably makes law.  One might concede that 
supreme court justices make law but nevertheless contend that intermediate 
appellate court judges merely “interpret and apply” the law, rather than make 
the law.146  In fact, however, Kansas Court of Appeals judges are lawmakers, 
too.  This was acknowledged by soon-to-be-Justice Lawton Nuss in 2002.147  
As Nuss said, when the Court of Appeals was created some 
believed that the new court primarily would make a “simple review 
of trial records” and correct the trial errors, e.g., evidentiary rulings.  
It would not develop and interpret the law. That function would 
remain with a supreme court that, now freed from its time-
consuming “correction of trial error” function, would have time for 
“more deliberate and mature consideration of cases having 
significant precedential value.”148 
The reality, Nuss explained, has been quite different: 
The [appeals] court has not acted solely as a corrector of routine trial 
error, however. For the first eight months of 2001, for example, 150 
of its opinions were published.  During this same time frame, the 
Supreme Court published 118 of its own opinions, revealing that a 
large percentage of the precedential cases in Kansas that year came 
from a court whose only reason for existence originally had been to 
provide more accessible, speedier and less costly appellate review 
for Kansas litigants.  Since the Supreme Court has granted petitions 
for review in less than 3% of the court of appeals’ opinions - which 
include the published ones - the higher court has apparently endorsed 
 
In State v. Kleypas, 272 Kan. 894, 40 P.3d 139 (2001), [this court] unanimously upheld 
the constitutionality of K.S.A. 21–4624(e).  Now, without any intervening change in 
substantive law, the majority opinion overrules Kleypas, not because the statute as 
construed is unconstitutional, but because the majority decides the Kleypas court 
exceeded its judicial authority in construing the statute. Kleypas was a 4 to 3 decision, 
consisting of a majority opinion and two written dissents. None of the three opinions 
took the position that the Kansas death penalty law must be struck down as 
constitutionally impermissible.  The majority opinion upheld the law with an extremely 
minor judicial construction relative to equipoise, with the three dissenters upholding 
the law as written. In the case before us, another 4 to 3 decision, the majority concludes 
the death penalty is fatally flawed and rejects the majority’s action in Kleypas which 
remedied the perceived equipoise flaw. There has been no change in relevant 
constitutional law as expressed by the United States Supreme Court.  The only change 
has been the composition of the Kansas Supreme Court occasioned by the retirements 
of Justices Larson, Six, Lockett, and Abbott. While fidelity to the doctrine of stare 
decisis is not an “inexorable command,” we should be highly skeptical of reversing an 
earlier decision where nothing has changed except the composition of the court. 
Id. at 482 (McFarland, C.J., dissenting). 
146. See Greene, supra note 79. 
147. Lawton M. Nuss, This Learned and Versatile Court, 71 J. KAN. B. ASS’N 22, 28 
(2002). 
148. Id. 
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this additional function of the lower court. While the court of appeals 
obviously is not replacing the Supreme Court, it nevertheless has 
clearly been allowed to assist the higher court as an important 
developer and interpreter of Kansas law.149 
Confirming Justice Nuss’s assessment of the Court of Appeals as “an 
important developer” of Kansas law, we now turn to examples of lawmaking 
by the Kansas Court of Appeals. 
1. Pleading Constructive Fraud 
“Notwithstanding the general liberality of notice pleading, a claim of 
fraud is one of those matters that must be pleaded ‘with particularity,’” 
explained the Kansas Court of Appeals in Hemphill v. Shore.150  “Our Supreme 
Court, however, has not determined ‘whether the heightened standard of 
pleading fraud with particularity applies when constructive fraud is being pled’ 
in Kansas.”151  Here, the judges on the Kansas Court of Appeals acknowledge 
that the judges on the Kansas Supreme Court make law.  The appeals judges in 
Hemphill did not say that the Kansas Legislature has not made the law on the 
pleading standard for constructive fraud.  The appeals court judges evidently 
do not expect the legislature to make such law.  The appeals court judges do 
expect the Kansas Supreme Court to make such law. 
However, the Kansas Supreme Court has not yet made such law, so what 
did the appeals court judges do?  They made the law on the pleading standard 
for constructive fraud.  They held that the heightened standard applies: “we are 
persuaded by the reasoning in the numerous court decisions [mostly outside 
Kansas] that have held that the specificity in pleading requirement applies to a 
constructive fraud claim.”152  Did the Court of Appeals have the power to rule 
the other way and thus make Kansas law different?  Yes, the judges on the 
Court of Appeals did not claim they were compelled to apply the heightened 
standard; they said they were “persuaded” to apply the heightened standard.  
They had lawmaking power and acknowledged it. 
2. Economic Loss 
In Louisburg Bldg. & Development Co., L.L.C. v. Albright,153 plaintiffs 
asserted both a breach of contract claim and a fraud-in-the-inducement claim.  
The district court granted defendant a judgment on the fraud–in–the–
inducement claim because of the economic–loss doctrine.154  Was this district 
 
149. Id. 
150. 239 P.3d 885, 892 (Kan. Ct. App. 2010). 
151. Id. 
152. Id. at 893. 
153. 252 P.3d 597 (Kan. Ct. App. 2011). 
154. Id. at 621.  The Court of Appeals summarized the economic loss doctrine as follows: 
The economic-loss doctrine originated in products-liability law, preventing purchasers 
from suing in tort where the damages claimed were purely economic—stemming from 
product-repair costs, product-replacement costs, inadequate product value, or lost 
profits resulting from product defects.  To recover in tort, the product purchaser with 
merely disappointed economic expectations had to demonstrate some “harm above and 
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court ruling correct or in error?  In answering this question, the Court of 
Appeals cited Kansas cases155 but did not suggest that these precedents were 
right on point.  That is, the appeals court judges did not suggest that these 
precedents compelled them to rule one way or the other.  Instead, the appeals 
court judges pointed out that: 
In the context of claims for fraud in the inducement, the economic-
loss doctrine has produced exceptional inconsistency. On one hand, a 
majority of states have held that the economic-loss doctrine never 
applies to fraud-in-the-inducement claims. . . . On the other hand, a 
minority of states have applied the economic-loss doctrine to fraud-
in-the-inducement claims that merely attempt to recover damages 
resulting from unfulfilled contractual promises.156 
The Court of Appeals then adopted the minority approach because “The 
minority’s approach is logical.”157  As it may well be.  But a majority of states 
adopted the contrary approach so many courts must see logic in that approach, 
as well.  In short, reasonable people can disagree about whether it is good 
policy for the economic loss doctrine to apply to any fraud-in-the-inducement 
claims.  Who got to convert their views on this policy question into Kansas 
law?  The judges on the Kansas Court of Appeals.  In doing so, they made 
Kansas law on the economic loss doctrine. 
3. Settlement Agreements 
Similar lawmaking by the Kansas Court of Appeals is evident in Roof-
Techs Intern, Inc. v. State,158 which involved a particular sort of settlement 
agreement.  The agreement purportedly assigned, from one settling party to 
another settling party, claims against a non-settling party.  The Court of 
Appeals said, “The legality of this kind of agreement has been, heretofore, 
 
beyond a broken contractual promise.” The doctrine initially aimed to prevent contract 
law from dissolving into tort law by drawing a distinction between commercial 
transactions, where contract law protects economic expectations, and consumer 
transactions, where tort law remedies physical injuries to individual consumers. 
The doctrine has since expanded to serve as the dividing line between contract and the 
broader array of tort claims, including claims for negligence and strict liability. Three 
policies seem to be driving the expansion of the doctrine: (1) protecting parties’ 
expectations with respect to their bargained-for limited liability; (2) encouraging the 
buyer to insure against the risk of economic loss; and (3) preventing “unnecessary 
complexity” resulting from the assertion of tort claims that merely duplicate breach-of-
contract claims.  This court has recognized similar policies in its own applications of 
the economic-loss doctrine.  This court has also held that these policies remain 
applicable when the purchaser is an individual consumer, as opposed to a sophisticated 
commercial purchaser. 
Id. at 621-22 (citations omitted). 
155. See, e.g., id. at 623 (“The Kansas Supreme Court has previously recognized the 
importance of this policy, warning against the ‘danger’ of allowing claims that attempt to turn 
every breach of contract into a tort.  See Gerhardt v. Harris, 261 Kan. 1007, 1021, 934 P.2d 976 
(1997)”). 
156. Id. at 622. 
157. Id. at 623. 
158. 57 P.3d 538 (Kan. Ct. App. 2002). 
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undetermined in Kansas.”159  The Court of Appeals then made law by 
enforcing the agreement before it.160 
In Roof-Techs, the Court of Appeals did not suggest that its hands were 
tied by a statute or by prior rulings of the Kansas Supreme Court.  To its credit, 
the Court of Appeals’ opinion frankly recognized that it was in uncharted 
territory.  So the appellate judges did what appellate judges do when in 
uncharted territory, they stepped up to their role as “occasional lawmakers”161 
and made the law on these sorts of settlement agreements. 
4. Medical Devices 
All the above examples of lawmaking by the Kansas Court of Appeals 
might be characterized as common law, rather than statutory law.  But the 
Kansas Court of Appeals makes law in its interpretation of statutes as well.  An 
example is § 360k(a) of the Medical Device Amendments to the Food, Drug, 
and Cosmetic Act.162 
Does this statute preempt state common-law tort claims alleging liability 
as to Class III medical devices?  Ultimately, this question could be resolved by 
the U.S. Supreme Court.  Until then, different jurisdictions may have different 
laws because different courts may rule differently.  In Troutman v. Curtis,163 
the Kansas Court of Appeals made Kansas law by holding that state common-
law tort claims alleging liability as to a Class III medical device are preempted 
by § 360k(a).164 
5. Legal Duty to Support a Negligence Claim 
A final example of lawmaking by the Kansas Court of Appeals, Berry v. 
National Medical Services, Inc.,165 is a mixture of judges making common law 
and judges making law by interpreting statutes.  Berry, a nurse licensed by the 
Kansas State Board of Nursing, admitted to the Board that she had a problem 
with alcohol dependency and agreed to submit to random testing to confirm 
that she was abstaining from alcohol.166  The Board contracted with defendant 
Compass Vision, Inc., to administrator this program, and Compass engaged 
defendant, NMS, to provide alcohol testing for nurses and to report its test 
results to the Board.167  Berry’s test results were positive, and the Board 
revoked Berry’s nursing license.168  Berry brought negligence actions against 
Compass and NMS.169  Defendants denied they owed a legal duty to Berry and 
 
159. Id. at 550. 
160. Id. at 554. 
161. See POSNER, supra note 9, at 81. 
162. 21 U.S.C. § 301 (2000 & Supp. III 2003). 
163. 143 P.3d 74 (Kan. Ct. App. 2006). 
164. Except for a claim that the manufacturer failed to comply with the approved federal 
standards. 
165. 205 P.3d 745 (Kan. Ct. App. 2009). 
166. Id. at 748. 
167. Id. 
168. Id. at 748-49. 
169. Id. at 749. 
FINAL FORMATTED 1. WARE ARTICLE - ORIGINALISM, BALANCE LEGAL REALISM, AND JUDICIAL SELECTION                                                                     
(DO NOT DELETE) 4/24/2013  1:50 AM 
202 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y [Vol. XXII:2 
persuaded the district court to dismiss Berry’s negligence claim.170 
The Kansas Court of Appeals majority reversed, holding that defendants 
did owe a legal duty to Berry.171  In so holding, the judges made law.  The 
Court of Appeals majority acknowledged this in noting that “[w]hether a legal 
duty exists is an issue of law over which appellate courts have unlimited 
review.”172 
While the majority resolved this issue of law in Berry’s favor, Judge 
Buser’s dissenting opinion would have resolved it in favor of the defendants.173  
In short, different judges on the Court of Appeals favored different legal rules.  
The majority of the three judges deciding the case got to make the law simply 
because they outnumbered the dissenting judge.  Just as a single state 
legislator’s vote can mean the difference between Kansas law including one 
rule or another, so a single Court of Appeals judge’s vote can mean the 
difference between Kansas law including one rule or another. 
While negligence law, including the duty element of a negligence claim, 
is generally common law, Kansas case law on whether to impose a duty 
considers, among other factors, whether there is a “public policy against 
imposing the claimed duty on the defendant.”174  Judge Buser’s dissenting 
opinion concluded that there was and reached that conclusion by interpreting 
certain Kansas statutes.175  By contrast, the majority interpreted the statutes 
differently and thus concluded that those statutes did not indicate a public 
policy against imposing the duty.176  The point, of course, is not to assess 
 
170. Id. 
171. Id. at 750. 
172. Id. at 749. 
173. Judge Buser “Would hold that laboratory testing facilities and third-party 
administrators do not owe a duty to nurses addicted to alcohol whose specimens they test under a 
contract with the administrative agency empowered by the legislature to regulate the professional 
competency of nurses.”  Id. at 753. 
174. Id. at 749. 
175. “It is the public policy of this state, as decided by the Kansas Legislature in its 
enactment of K.S.A. 65-1120, that the Kansas State Board of Nursing (Board) has authority to 
establish, regulate, and enforce the professional competency of nurses. Moreover, pursuant to 
K.S.A. 77-621(c), the legislature has granted the judiciary a limited power to review (using a 
deferential standard) the Board’s disciplinary actions against impaired nurses. These legislatively 
established public policies are undermined by the majority’s decision of first impression in 
Kansas.”  Id. at 752-53. 
176.  
Finally, there is no public policy against imposing liability. We defer to our 
legislature in establishing public policy and find no expression by our legislature that 
urinalysis providers are exempt from liability for their negligence in providing faulty 
results or interpretations. These defendants, as testing providers to the Board, do not 
argue that they are protected by sovereign immunity. We find no public policy that 
would immunize these defendants from the consequences of their actions. Therefore, 
the third element for establishing a duty has been satisfied. 
In this regard we note the dissent’s public policy argument which is predicated upon 
the fact that this claim arose in the context of administrative proceedings to determine 
Berry’s fitness to practice her profession. The dissent seems to confuse the wrongful 
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whether the majority or dissent better interpreted the statutes.  The point is to 
note another example in which judges make law in the course of interpreting 
statutes. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
What do these examples from Kansas’s two appellate courts show?  Only 
judges making law.  No surprise, of course.  We have known, at least since the 
Legal Realists of the early 20th Century, that judges make law.  And it is 
similarly well established that, although judging has a professional/technical 
side, as well as a political/lawmaking side, the latter’s importance rises, the 
higher the court.  All appellate judges are “occasional legislators”177 and 
supreme court justices are tremendously important and powerful lawmakers.  
So no one within the mainstream of our country’s 20th and 21st Century legal 
thought will be surprised by this article’s demonstration of repeated lawmaking 
by the judges on the Kansas Supreme Court and the Kansas Court of 
Appeals.178 
The decisions summarized in this article show Kansas’s two appellate 
courts making law in the course of deciding cases.  Whether the law made in 
any of these cases is good or bad policy is, of course, beside the point.  The 
point is that the policy views of appellate judges matter because appellate 
judges are lawmakers—so the Kansas judges and lawyers who omit 
lawmaking from their description of the appellate judge’s role omit something 
 
conduct Berry complains of with the product of that wrongful conduct. The wrongful 
conduct in this action is the claimed negligence of Compass and NMS, not the action 
of the Board in revoking Berry’s nursing license. The consequence of this claimed 
negligence was the loss of Berry’s license and the damages that followed. 
We conclude that under Kansas law Berry has alleged the breach of a recognizable 
duty, and she has pled a cause of action for which relief may be granted. 
Id. at 750. 
177. POSNER, supra note 9, at 81. 
178. As then-State Senator, now-Attorney General of Kansas, Derek Schmidt, said: 
[T]he law is not always black-and-white — particularly when it presents itself in the 
form of the difficult issues that confront the Supreme Court [of Kansas].  If the difficult 
questions of law could always - or even usually - be settled with a clearly correct 
answer merely by reading and applying the constitutions, statutes and cases, then there 
would be no need to have seven justices on the Supreme Court.  One would suffice - so 
long as that one was sufficiently learned in the law. 
But, of course, that is not the nature of the law - as evidenced, inter alia, by the many 
split decisions of our Supreme Court.  Being properly experienced and credentialed in 
the law is a necessary but not sufficient condition for being an excellent justice.  
Judgment also is required as is a sensitivity to societal norms, trends, conditions and 
expectations.  To put the point another way, justices require a certain amount of 
political savvy. 
Judicial philosophy matters.  Of course it does. To pretend otherwise is to believe 
the law is a math or science rather than an art or social studies. 
Constitutional Amendment to have the Supreme Court Justices appointments Subject to Consent 
by the Senate: Hearing on SCR 1606 before S. Comm. on Judiciary, 2005 Leg. (Ks. Feb. 21, 
2005) (written testimony of Senator Derek Schmidt, at 6). 
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significant.  A published statement describing the appellate judge’s role as 
though it does not include lawmaking encourages non-lawyers to believe the 
myth that judges apply law made by others but do not inevitably make law 
themselves. 
Those non-lawyers who (wrongly) believe that judges are not lawmakers 
cannot be troubled by the fact that the Missouri Plan—even Kansas’s uniquely 
extreme version of it179—is an aberrant violation of our society’s practice of 
selecting lawmakers democratically.  Non-lawyers who believe in the principle 
that lawmakers should be selected democratically need to know that judicial 
selection is lawmaker selection to be troubled by the Missouri Plan’s violation 
of this principle.  Non-lawyers who do not know that judges inevitably make 
law may believe that the role of a judge consists only of its 
professional/technical side and, therefore, believe that judges should be 
selected entirely on their professional competence and ethics and that 
assessments of these factors are best left to lawyers.  In short, a lawyer who 
omits lawmaking from a published statement about the judicial role is 
furthering a misimpression that helps empower lawyers at the expense of non-
lawyers, in violation of basic democratic equality, the principle of one-person, 
one-vote. 
Lawyers (in Kansas or elsewhere) who seek to defend the power 
advantage the Missouri Plan gives them over other citizens can honestly 
acknowledge that this is a power advantage in the selection of lawmakers and 
then explain why they believe a departure from the principle of one-person, 
one-vote is justified in the selection of these particular lawmakers.  But no 
honest Kansas lawyer who has been exposed to the cases discussed in this 
article can defend the state’s current method of appellate court selection with a 
description of the judicial role that omits lawmaking.  Honesty requires those 
who believe the Kansas bar should select any member of a judicial nominating 
commission to acknowledge that they are advocating discrimination against 
non-lawyers in the selection of lawmakers.  The same point undoubtedly 
applies as well in the other 49 states.  Debate over judicial selection in the 
United States can be honest if it forthrightly acknowledges that judicial 
selection is lawmaker selection. 
 
179. See id. at Section II (describing the Kansas process). 
